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I. SURPRISE # 1:
LOUISIANA HAS ALWAYS HAD CHOICE-OF-LAW LEGISLATION
The above statement is, of course, not new. Although it may be surprising
to some out-of-state lawyers, it should not be surprising to any Louisiana lawyer.
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The latter knows that, unlike many states of the United States, Louisiana has
always provided statutorily for problems of conflict of laws. As early as 1808,
Louisiana followed the civil-law tradition and included choice-of-law rules in the
Preliminary Title of its first civil code, the Digest of 1808., With several
amendments and rearrangements, these articles remained in effect until January
1, 1992, when they were replaced by a set of comprehensive articles described
later in this paper.' These articles were supplemented by conflicts rules found
in the Revised Statutes, such as the Insurance Code,3 the Commercial Code,4
the Worker's Compensation Act,5 the Consumer Credit and Consumer Protection
statutes,6 and the Lease of Movables Act.7 Together with Civil Code Article
15 of the Civil Code of 1870, which contained choice-of-law rules on the form
and effect of contracts, testaments, and other juridical acts, marital property, and
liberative prescription,8 these statutes provided a fairly extensive, though not
complete, network of choice-of-law rules.
Yet, many Louisiana conflicts cases, including cases decided during the
survey period,9 are decided as if these rules did not exist. For tort conflicts, this
phenomenon is understandable. Before 1992, the only statutory provision that
had a bearing on tort conflicts was Article 14 of the Civil Code, which provided
that "[t]he law is obligatory upon all inhabitants of the State indiscriminately
[and that] the foreigner, whilst residing in the State ... [is] subject to the laws
of the State.' '10 This highly territorialist article was simultaneously overbroad
and elliptical. It was overbroad to the extent it purported to subject to Louisiana
law all events occurring or persons found therein. It was elliptical in that it did
not expressly designate the law that should apply to events occurring or persons
1. See Articles 9 and 10 of the Preliminary Title of the Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force
in the Territory of Orleans (1808). These rules were expanded by the Civil Code of 1825 and were
reproduced in the Civil Code of 1870 as Articles 9 and 10 of that code. In 1978, Article 10 was
expanded further by the addition of other choice-of-law rules transferred from other parts of the Civil
Code. In 1987, the two articles were renumbered as Articles 14 and 15 respectively and remained in
effect until January 1, 1992. They continue to apply to actions filed before that date. See infra notes
40-41.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 28-224.
3. See La. R.S. 22:611 et seq. (1978 & Supp. 1993).
4. See, e.g., La. R.S. 10:1-105 (1993); La. R.S. 10:9-103 (1993).
5. See La. R.S. 23:1035.1 (1975).
6. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:3511 (1991); La. R.S. 51:1418 (1987).
7. See La. R.S. 9:3302 et seq. (1991). See also La. R.S. 9:2778 (Supp. 1993), and La. R.S.
38:2196 (Supp. 1993) on public contracts, and La. R.S. 9:2779 (Supp. 1993) on construction
contracts.
8. For a detailed discussion of the history, meaning, and application of Article 15 of the 1870
Civil Code (corresponding to Article 10 of the 1808 Digest), see Symeon C. Symeonides, Exploring
the "'Dismal Swamp": Revising Louisiana's Conflicts Law on Successions, 47 La. L. Rev. 1029,
1038-42, 1055-56, 1076-86 (1987).
9. The survey period is from January 1, 1992 to October 1, 1993, the time of this writing.
This paper focuses on cases decided under the new conflicts law. Cases rendered after January 1,
1992, but decided under the old law, are discussed only in a limited manner.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 14 (effective until Jan. 1, 1992, repealed by 1991 La. Acts No. 923).
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found outside Louisiana. The excessiveness and incompleteness of this article,
and the fact that it was not expressly geared for tort conflicts, may explain why
it has been virtually ignored by Louisiana courts in tort conflicts.
From the beginning, Louisiana courts assumed a lack of statutory authority
on this matter and proceeded to develop jurisprudential rules, borrowed mostly
from sister states. For more than a century and a half, Louisiana courts adhered
to the rule of lex loci delicti, that is, applying the law of the place of the tort, for
both Louisiana and foreign torts. This rule was abandoned in the 1973 case of
Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co.," in which the Louisiana Supreme Court refused
to apply Mississippi law to an action arising out of a traffic accident in
Mississippi that involved two members of a Louisiana family. Jagers held that
Mississippi "had no interest" in applying its law to the particular issue,
intrafamily immunity, before the court, and that Louisiana was instead the only
"interested" state.12 Using the prevailing conflicts jargon, the court described
this case as presenting a "false conflict," that is, a case in which only one of the
two involved states, here Louisiana, "had an interest" in applying its law. 3 The
supreme court's reference to "state interests" and "false conflicts" between them
was a clear indication that the court was thinking in terms of a methodology
known as "governmental interest analysis." First advanced by Professor Brainerd
Currie,"a this methodology has since been followed by many American courts.
Although this inference was strengthened by the court's citations to Currie's
works, the court also cited the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 5 thus
giving mixed signals as to the particular methodology it was inclined to follow
in the future. In the absence of supreme court guidance, lower courts have
speculated, improvised, and eventually ended up with a combination of interest
analysis and the Restatement Second. 16 This jurisprudence has for all practical
purposes filled the perceived vacuum of statutory authority for tort conflicts in
Louisiana. It is too late and would serve no purpose to argue that this vacuum
11. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
12. For a thoughtful discussion of Jagers, see Harvey Couch, Louisiana Adopts Interest
Analysis: Applause and Some Observations, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
13. 276 So. 2d at 311-12. In American conflicts jargon, a "false conflict" is a multistate case
in which only one of the involved states is "interested" in having its law applied because the policies
embodied in that law would be promoted by that law's application in the particular case. When more
than one state is interested in having its law applied, the resulting conflict is characterized as a "true
conflict." When no state is interested in having its law applied, the case is characterized as an
"unprovided-for" case because no solution was provided for such cases by the methodology that
developed this jargon, namely Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis. See Brainerd Currie,
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, 175-187 passim (1963). For the utility of the above labels
in modern choice-of-law methodology, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Revolution and Counter-
Revolution in American Conflicts Law: Is there a Middle Ground?, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 549, 564-66
(1985).
14. See generally Currie, supra note 13.
15. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) [hereinafter Restatement Second].
16. For a thorough discussion of Louisiana jurisprudence in tort conflicts before the new law,
see James J. Hautot, Choice of Law in Louisiana: Torts, 47 La. L. Rev. 1109 (1987).
1.994]
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was more apparent than real. 7 Thus, in tort conflicts actions which were filed
before January 1, 1992, and which were therefore governed by this jurisprudence,
it was accurate to say that Louisiana choice-of-law rules were derived from a
combination of interest analysis and the Restatement Second. Several cases
decided during the survey period fit in this category. 8
However, the same is not true for other conflicts, such as contract conflicts
or insurance conflicts, which were expressly provided for by Louisiana
legislation, such as Civil Code Article 15 or the Insurance Code.' 9 These
provisions may be too simplistic or rigid to be satisfactory today, but they are
also too specific to be replaced through judicial fiat by interest analysis, the
Restatement Second, or, for that matter, any academic theory. Nevertheless,
many Louisiana courts and federal courts sitting in diversity have done just
that.20 Cases decided during the survey period have done the same.2' Inci-
17. Despite its many shortcomings, Article 14 of the Civil Code of 1870 (effective until Jan.
1992, repealed by 1991 La. Acts No. 923) could provide the basis for at least a unilateral lex loci
delicti rule; that is, a rule authorizing the application of Louisiana law to Louisiana torts. The rule
could then be "bilateralized" by judicial fiat to a rule that authorized the application of the law of the
place of the tort to torts occurring outside Louisiana. This is exactly how a similar article of the
Code Napoleon has been interpreted in France. Article 3 of the Code Napoleon, taken from Article
4 of Title IV of the French Projet du Gouvernement of 1800, which was also the source of the
Louisiana article, provides in part that "[tihe laws of police and public safety obligate all those
inhabiting the territory." This article was used by French courts as the basis for applying the lex loci
delicti to both French and foreign torts. See I H. Batiffol & P. Lagarde, Droit international privd
321-36 (7th ed. 1981). Needless to say, it is just as well that Louisiana courts did not follow this
path. Although the lex loci delicti rule was the rule adopted by Louisiana courts, it was purely a
jurisprudential creation based on common-law authorities, and thus it could be abandoned much more
easily than a rule based on a Civil Code article.
18. See, e.g., Franz, v. olab, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1537 (E.D. La. 1992); Trosclair v. Walt Disney
World Co., Civ. A. No. 89-2317, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 310 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 1993); Popeyes, Inc.
v. Tokita, Civ. A. Nos. 87-3011, 90-1179, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13295 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 1993).
19. For a good discussion of the conflicts provisions of the Insurance Code and the
jurisprudence applying them, see Michael W. Mengis, Note, Conflict of Laws: Insurance, 47 La. L.
Rev. 1213, 1219-20 (1987).
20. See, inter alia, Sandefer Oil & Gas v. AIG Oil Rig of Texas, Inc., 846 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
1988); Wickham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 951 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Sutton v. Langley,
330 So. 2d 321, 327-328 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 332 So. 2d 805, 820 and 333 So. 2d 242
(La. 1976).
21. See, e.g., Francis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991), an
insurance conflicts case that contains no reference to Article 15 or the Insurance Code, but does
contain a long quotation from the Restatement Second. The quotation is preceded by the following
statement: "Rigid application of the lex loci contractus rule of conflicts of laws has ceased in
Louisiana .... [Tlhe intent of the Restatement (Second) ... to accomplish this result is evidenced
by the [Restatement's] Introductory Note." Id. at 1041 (emphasis added). Unlike Francis, other
cases, such as Baker v. Lazarus, Civ. A. No. 91-2463, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7083 (E.D. La. May
13, 1992), Ankum v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-2990, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16203
(E.D. La. Oct. 19, 1992), and Radiophone Inc. v. PriCellular Corp., Civ. A. No. 91-4306, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17007 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 1992), show more sensitivity to Louisiana's hierarchy of
sources of law. In these cases, the court cites Civil Code article 15 but considers itself bound by
Fifth Circuit decisions, especially Sandefer, 846 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1988), which have construed away
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dentally, even the Restatement itself recognizes this principle and requires a court
to obey any statutory choice-of-law "directive" found in the forum's law and to
resort to the Restatement only in the absence of such directive. 2 Yet, one
Louisiana case decided during the survey period found in the Restatement an
intent to replace Louisiana's statutory rule of lex loci contractus.2" Such an
open disregard for statutory provisions is of course inappropriate in any state that
adheres to the principle of legislative supremacy. What is appropriate is to
interpret and "update" a dated statutory provision with the aid of modem
academic theories. Great jurists like Judges Tate and Rubin have demonstrated
how this can be done without offending the principle of legislative supremacy.24
Equally troublesome is the tendency of some courts to go through the whole
choice-of-law discussion without any reference to any statutory authority,
whether it be Civil Code Article 15 or more specific statutes containing conflicts
provisions, such as the Insurance Code.25 The tendency of some law clerks to
rely exclusively on cases may also be responsible for the fact that at least one
case decided during the survey period refers to an article of the civil code that
was repealed five years before the decision was rendered and well before the
action was filed.26 When a clerk relies on cases only, and the cases are old
Article 15. Baker states that "Louisiana courts ... have either (I) totally ignored article 15 and
applied the interest analysis, or (2) interpreted article 15 in such a fashion that it amounted to interest
analysis."
22. See Restatement Second, supra note 15, § 6, which provides in part: "A court ... will
follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law. . . . When there is no such directive,
the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable law include .... "
23. See Francis, 581 So. 2d 1036. This idea was inspired from another notorious case, Sutton
v. Langley, 330 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), which was relied upon heavily by the Francis
court.
24. See Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1982); Stickney v.
Smith, 693 F.2d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 1982). For Judge Tate's contribution to the development of
Louisiana conflicts law, including the abandonment of the lex loci delicti, see Symeon C.
Symeonides, Louisiana Conflicts Jurisprudence, A Student Symposium: Introduction, 47 La. L. Rev.
1105, 1106-07 (1987).
25. See Peavey Co. v. M/V ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1992) (insurance conflict; no
reference to La. Civ. Code art. 15 or the conflicts provisions of the Louisiana Insurance Code; finding
a false conflict under interest analysis); Mac Sales, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Civ. A.
No. 89-4571, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5378 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 1992) (insurance conflict; no reference
to La. Civ. Code art. 15 or the Louisiana Insurance Code; quoting Restatement Second, supra note
15, § 188); Facility Management v. American Sign & Indicator, Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-0609, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9530 (E.D. La. June 17, 1992) (contract case); Ashland Chem. v. Lombardino, Civ. A.
No. 92-2434, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13736 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 1993) (choice of law clause in anti-
competition agreement).
26. Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, Civ. A. No. 86-4242, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12795
(E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1992), contains the statement that "Louisiana's conflicts of laws rule is contained
in LSA CC Art. 10." Yet, since January 1, 1988, La. Civ. Code art. 10 contains nothing of this sort;
instead, Article 10 contains a rule of how to interpret ambiguous statutes. The correct reference
should have been to Article 15 of the Louisiana Code of 1870 which replaced former Article 10 in
1988 and was eventually repealed by 1991 La. Acts No. 923.
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ones, the information contained therein may be outdated; neither LEXIS nor
Westlaw are likely to catch such details.
Finally, nothing is more lamentable than the phenomenon of ignoring
completely the choice-of-law question. The tendency of overburdened courts to
want to avoid the complexities of the choice-of-law discussion with the concomi-
tant possibility of having to apply a foreign law is perfectly understandable. In
an adversary system, the court should not be expected to argue the parties' case.
If neither party raises the choice-of-law issue, most courts will not raise it
eitherY.2  Less understandable, however, is the reason for which some attorneys
fail to raise this issue when it is in their interest to do so, such as when the
foreign law is more favorable to their client. Although in some cases this
practice may be explained by tactical reasons, sometimes it is the result of the
attorney's unfamiliarity with conflicts law. Unfortunately, the price of this
unfamiliarity is paid by the client.
II. SURPRISE # 2:
LOUISIANA HAS A NEW COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON CHOICE OF LAW
A. The New Law
As of January 1, 1992, Louisiana has a new comprehensive conflicts
codification.28 Since this is a relatively recent occurrence, it would be
understandable if the above statement surprises some readers.29 Such a surprise,
however, is preferable to a surprise in the courtroom. The new law was drafted
under the auspices of the Louisiana Law Institute during the years 1984-88, and
27. See, e.g., Trask v. Peak, Civ. A. No. 91-4199, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7024, at *5 (E.D.
La. May 17, 1993) ("Inasmuch as the parties detect no conflict of law issues, neither shall the
court."); Peterson v. State Farm Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 92-2135, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14440, at *3
n.l (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 1993) ("The court will not undertake an extensive conflict of law analysis....
[Diefendant . . . . who bears the burden of proof here, has not undertaken any choice of law
analysis .... Without such discussion, the court will assume that Louisiana law applies."). There
are, however, certain commendable exceptions. See, e.g., Dugger v. Upledger Inst., 795 F. Supp. 184
(E.D. La. 1992), in which Judge Mentz notes that two of the parties "appear to ignore the [choice-of-
law] matter entirely. The Court cannot so blithely dismiss the conflicts question at hand, however."
Id. at 186; Naquin v. Prudential Assur. Co., Civ. A. No. 92-3189, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6015 (E.D.
La. May 3, 1993), in which Judge Sear orders the parties to submit "briefs addressing the issue of
conflict of laws." Id. at *4; First Alabama Bank v. Baber, Civ. A. No. 92-1662, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13977 (E.D. La. Sept 15, 1992), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 121-128, a case
in which one of the parties, a non-lawyer, appeared pro se, and in which the same judge makes the
best out of an incomplete record.
28. 1991 La. Acts No. 923, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1992).
29. Although the new law has already been translated into several foreign languages and has
received national and international attention, see infra qotes 32, 35, 44, it has yet to attract the
attention of the average Louisiana lawyer. For a comprehensive discussion of the new law in the
field of tort conflicts, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for Tort
Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677 (1992).
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was adopted unanimously by the House of Representatives and by the Senate
during the 1991 legislative session.30 It is the first comprehensive attempt at
conflicts codification in the United States and the first one in Louisiana since
1825. It draws from the vast laboratory of American conflicts experience and
codifies, updates, and streamlines Louisiana conflicts jurisprudence.
The new law replaced the two conflicts articles in the Preliminary Title of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 with thirty-six new articles. The first of these
articles is placed in the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, as Article 14, while
the remaining thirty-five articles are placed in a newly formed Book IV of the
Civil Code and are numbered from 3515 to 3549. Article 14 functions as a
cross-reference for the users of the code who were accustomed to looking for its
conflicts provisions in the Preliminary Title. The article also delineates the scope
of Book IV by providing that "[u]nless otherwise expressly provided by the law
of this state, cases having contacts with other states are governed by the law
selected in accordance with the provisions of Book IV of this Code." Thus,
Book IV applies to all multistate cases or "cases having contacts with other
states," whether these contacts pertain to the domicile of the parties, the
transaction or the occurrence giving rise to the dispute, or the location of its
object or subject matter. These "foreign" contacts may implicate the laws of the
involved foreign states in a way that raises the potential of a conflict between
their laws and the law of Louisiana. Book IV establishes the principles for
determining whether such a conflict actually exists in a given case, and, if so,
how it should be resolved.
Moreover, through its introductory phrase "[u]nless otherwise expressly
provided by the law of this state," Article 14 establishes the residual character
of Book IV vis-a-vis other more specific provisions of Louisiana legislation.
Book IV is not intended to supersede more specific conflicts rules contained in
other Louisiana statutes, such as those found in the Insurance Code, the
Commercial Code, the Consumer Credit or Consumer Protection statutes, and the
Lease of Movables Act." When applicable, those rules, being more specific,
will prevail over the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code.
Book IV is subdivided into eight titles with headings that are indicative of
their general scope: Title I is entitled General Provisions; 32 Title II,
30. Representatives Randy Roach and Allen Bradley and Senator Sidney B. Nelson were the
sponsors of the bill in the Louisiana House of Representatives and Senate, respectively. This author
had the privilege of drafting the bill as Reporter for the Louisiana State Law Institute. David Conroy,
Harvey Couch, James L. Dennis, Cordell H. Haymon, Harry T. Lemmon, Howard W. L'Enfant,
Andrew Rinker, Jr., Ray J. Rabalais, Katherine S. Spaht, and A.N. Yiannopoulos served as members
of the Advisory Committee.
31. See supra notes 3-7.
32. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3515-3518. These articles are discussed in Symeon C. Symeonides,
Private International Law Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Louisiana Experience, 57
Rabels Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht, 460, 463-83 (1993) [hereinafter
Symeonides, The Louisiana Experience]; Symeon C. Symeonides, Les grands problnes de droit
international privdf et la nouvelle codification de Louisiane, 81 Revue critique du droit international
1994]
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Status;33 Title III, Marital Property;3  Title IV, Successions3 s Title V, Real
Rights;36 Title VI, Conventional Obligations; 37 Title VII, Delictual and Quasi-
Delictual Obligations;38 and Title VIII, Liberative Prescription.39
According to section 4 of Act 923 of 1991, the new law "shall apply to all
privd 223, 233-81 (1992) [hereinafter cited as Symeonides, Les grands probldmes]; Symeonides,
supra note 29, at 685-696; Symeon C. Symeonides, Synchones Kodikopoitikes Technikes sto Idiotiko
Diethnes Dikaio, 13 Revue helldnique de droit europen (forthcoming 1994). The above articles, as
well as the new law in general, are also discussed in the following American and foreign
publications: Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 599 (2d ed. 1992); Gonzalo Parra-
Arranguren, Curso General de Derecho Internacional Privado (Problemas Selectos) 247-50 (1991);
Erik Jayme, Neue Kodifikation des Internationalen Privatrechts in Louisiana, 13 Praxis des
Internationalen Privat- und Verfarensrechts [IPRax] 56 (1993-1); D. Kokkini-latridou & K. Boele-
Woelki, Opemerkingen Over De "Schets Van Een Algemene Wet Betreffende Het IPR", 10
Nederlands Intemationaal Privaatrecht 477,478,498,509-10, 512 passin (1992); D. Kokkini-latridou
& K. Boele-Woelki, De Adoptieregeling Van De IPR-Schets In Rechtsvergelijkend Perspektief, 11
Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 365, 368 passim (1993); Gonzalo Parra-Arranguren, Las
recientes codificaciones del Derecho internacional privado en el hemisferio Americano, 43 Revista
de la Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Catolica Andrfs Bello 361, 393-94, 404-06, 414-15 (1991);
Gonzalo Parra-Arranguren, General Course of Private International Law, Academy of International
Law, 210 Recueil des cours 9, 192-194 (1988-111); Gonzalo Parra-Arranguren, Recent Developments
in Private International Law in the Americas, 39 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 229, 233-34, 237-38 (1992);
Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, Academy of International Law, 232
Recueil des cours 9, 59-63 passim (1992-1).
33. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3519-3522. These articles are discussed in Symeonides, The
Louisiana Experience, supra note 32, at 483-86.
34. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3523-3527. A 1987 Draft of these articles is discussed in Carol S.
Bruch, Codification of Conflicts Law: The Louisiana Draft, 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 255 (1987); William
Reppy, Viewpoint: Louisiana's 'Hybrid' Quasi-Connnunity Property Statute Could Cause Unfairness,
13(3) Comm. Prop. J. 1 (1986); Symeon C. Symeonides, In Search of New Choice-of-Law Solutions
to Some Marital Property Problems of Migrant Spouses: A Response to the Critics, 13(3) Comm.
Prop. J. 11 (1986); Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's Draft on Successions and Marital Property,
35 Am. J. Comp. L. 259, 266-85 (1987) [hereinafter Louisiana's Draft). With few minor differences
in language, Articles 3523 to 3527 of the new law correspond with Articles 8 to 12 of the 1987 Draft
discussed in these writings. These articles are also discussed in Symeonides, The Louisiana
Experience, supra note 32, at 486-90; and Mike Hays, Property Rights: Perspectives on Louisiana's
Statutes on Conflict of Laws, 41 La. Bar J. 124 (1993).
35. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3528-3534. A 1987 Draft of these articles is discussed in
Symeonides, supra note 8; and Symeonides, Louisiana's Draft, supra note 34, at 260-70. Articles
I to 7 of that Draft correspond to Articles 3528 to 3534 respectively. However, Article 2 of that
Draft has been revised so as to include vices of consent. See now Article 3529 of the new law. The
new articles are also discussed in Symeonides, The Louisiana Experience, supra note 32, at 490-92;
and Hays, supra note 34.
36. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3535-3536. These articles are discussed in Symeonides, The
Louisiana Experience, supra note 32, at 492-495.
37. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3537-3541. These articles are discussed in Symeonides, The
Louisiana Experience, supra note 32, at 495-502, and at text accompanying infra notes 115-139.
38. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3542-3548. For a discussion of these articles, see infra note 44,
and the authorities cited therein.
39. This Title consists of only one article, La. Civ. Code art. 3549, which is discussed in text
accompanying infra notes 180-224.
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actions filed after that date."'  The quoted phrase means that the new law: (a)
does not apply to actions already in progress on that date;41 and (b) does apply
to actions filed after its effective date even if the events giving rise to these
actions have occurred before the above date. In these cases, however, the
application of the new law must remain within the confines of the Louisiana and
federal constitutions, which prohibit the retroactive application of a law if such
an application would deprive someone of vested rights without due process of
law.42
The balance of this paper focuses on cases decided under the new law as of
the time of this writing,43 and discusses the new law only to the extent
necessary to analyze these cases. These cases fall in three categories: torts,
contracts, and liberative prescription.
B. Cases Decided Under the New Law
1. Tort Conflicts"
a. Issues of Loss Distribution
The first tort conflict to be decided by a Louisiana appellate court under the
new law is Levy v. Jackson.45  Levy involved Article 3544 of the new law,
40. 1991 La. Acts No. 923, § 4.
41. However, the new law might well, and should, influence judicial opinion in such actions.
See, e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. NEI Peebles Elec. Prods., 819 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. La. 1993); Em
Nominee Co. v. Arkla Energy Resources, Inc.. 615 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
42. See generally La. Civ. Code art. 6 and comments thereunder.
43. See supra note 9.
44. For a discussion of the tort articles of the new law by this author, see Symeonides, supra
note 29, at 696-67; Symeon C. Symeonides, Problems and Dilemmas in Codifying Choice of Law
for Torts: The Louisiana Experience in a Comparative Perspective, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 431 (1990);
and Symeon C. Symeonides, La Nuova Norinativa della Louisiana sul Diritto luternazionale Privato
in tema di Responsabilita Extracontrattuale, 29 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privado e Processuale
43 (1993). For discussions by other authors, see Jean-Claude Cornu, Choice of Law in Tort: A
Comparative Study of the Louisiana Draft on Delictual and Quasi-Delictual Obligations and the Swiss
Statute on Private International Law (1989) (LL.M. Thesis on reserve with the LSU Law Library);
Scoles & Hay, supra note 32, at 635; Peter Hay, Flexibility Versus Predictability and Uniformity in
Choice of Law, 226 Recueil des cours 281, 387-91 (1991-1); Peter Hay & Robert B. Ellis, Bridging
the Gap Between Rules and Approaches in Tort Choice of Law ini the United States: A Survey of
Current Case Low, 27 Int'l Law. 369, 383-86 (1993); John P. Kozyris, Values and Methods in
Choice of Low for Products Liability: A Comparative Comment oni Statutory Solutions, 38 Am. J.
Comp. L. 475 (1990); Vischer, supra note 32; Russell J. Weintraub, The Contributions of S.meonides
and Kozyris in Making Choice of Lw Predictable and Just: An Appreciation and Critique, 38 Am.
J. Comp. L. 511 (1990) [hereinafter Contributions of Symeonides and Kozyris]; Russell J. Weintraub,
An Approach to Choice of Law that Focuses opi Consequences, 56 AIb. L. Rev. 701, 715-17 (1993)
[hereinafter Approach to Choice of Low].
45. 612 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (on rehearing). Levy arose out of a traffic accident
in Louisiana that occurred before the effective date of the new law. The court does not mention the
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which deals with conflicts on "[i]ssues pertaining to loss distribution and
financial protection," such as guest-statutes and other immunities from suit or
compensatory damages. This article provides in part that, if at the time of the
injury both the injured person and the person who caused the injury were
domiciled in the same state, the law of the common domicile applies, even if the
conduct and injury occurred in another state, and regardless of whether the state
of the common domicile provides for a higher or for a lower standard of
financial protection than does the law of the state of conduct and injury.47 The
operation of this rule has been illustrated elsewhere by the following table.48
TABLE I
(The common-domicile rule of Art. 3544(1))
# C I P D Applicable Law
1 - A A j A.. .........  ... .. . .. ... ....  ..... A ............ 
2 - - a a a
In this table, the second and third columns represent the places of conduct(C)
and injury(I) respectively,49 the next two columns represent the domicile of the
date of the filing of the action. As explained earlier, this date is important for determining whether
the case will be governed directly by the new or the old law. If the action was filed before January
1, 1992, the case would be governed by the old jurisprudence. If the action was filed after January
1, 1992, the case would be governed by the new law. In the event that the new law would produce
a different result than the pre-1992 jurisprudence, the defeated litigant would be expected to raise the
issue of the potential unconstitutionality of such "retroactive" application of the new law. The Levy
court decided the case under the new law but preempted any retroactivity issues by carefully
explaining how the same result would obtain under the pre-1992 jurisprudence. For tort conflicts
cases decided after January 1, 1992, but applying the old law, see Franz v. lolab, Inc., 801 F. Supp.
1537 (E.D. La. 1992); Trosclair v. Walt Disney World Co., Civ. A. No. 89-2317, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 310 (E.D. La. Jan. 1I, 1993); Popeyes, Inc. v. Tokita, Civ. A. Nos. 87-3011, 90-1179, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13295 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 1993).
46. For an explanation of the meaning of this term and detailed discussion, see Symeonides,
supra note 29, at 699-705.
47. See La. Civ. Code art. 3544, subpar. 1, which provides as follows:
Art. 3544. Issues of loss distribution and financial protection. Issues pertaining to loss
distribution and financial protection are governed, as between a person injured by an
offense or quasi-offense and the person who caused the injury, by the law designated in
the following order:
(1) If, at the time of the injury, the injured person and the person who caused the injury
were domiciled in the same state, by the law of that state. Persons domiciled in states
whose law on the particular issue is substantially identical shall be treated as if domiciled
in the same state.
48. See Symeonides, supra note 29, at 718-25.
49. The use of the symbol "-" indicates that the identity of the state represented by the
particular column is inconsequential. It may be assumed that the law of that state is the opposite to
that of the other state in the same line.
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"injured person" or plaintiff(P) and the "person who caused the injury" or
defendant(D) respectively, while the last column represents the state whose law
is applicable under the first subparagraph of the article. The use of a lower-case
letter in a particular column indicates that the state represented by that column
has a "lower" standard of financial protection, such as a "guest-statute," an
immunity-from-suit rule, or a limit on the amount of compensatory damages,
than the other state involved in the conflict. The use of a capital letter indicates
that the particular state has a "higher" standard, such as a non-immunity rule or
a higher amount of compensatory damages, than the other state involved in the
conflict.
Levy v. Jackson fits into pattern # 2 because both the injured person and the
person who caused the injury were domiciled in a state, Alabama, whose law
barred recovery ("lower standard") and were involved in an accident in another
state that provided for recovery ("higher standard"). The injured person was a
minor child riding in her father's car when he crossed through a red light and
collided with another car driven by a Louisianian in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Under Alabama's so-called guest statute, a driver and his insurer are immune
from suit by a person injured while riding as a gratuitous guest in the automo-
bile, unless the driver is proven guilty of "willful or wanton misconduct." Since
Louisiana has no such statute, the injured passenger was free to sue the driver
and his insurer for ordinary negligence. The Levy court properly characterized
the resulting conflict as one involving an issue of loss distribution and held that,
under subparagraph 1 of Article 3544 of the new law, Alabama law was
applicable to the dispute between the Alabama host driver and his Alabama
guest-passenger.
50
The court then explained why the result would have been the same under
pre-1992 jurisprudence by comparing the case with Jagers,5" the only analogous
case from the supreme court, and with Hanzo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,52 a
case from the same appellate district. In both of these cases the court applied
the law of the common domicile of the host-driver and guest-passenger. As in
Levy, in both Jagers and Hanzo, the tortfeasor and the victim were domiciled in
50. 612 So. 2d 894, 896 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (on rehearing).
51. Jagers v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973). The issue in Jagers was
whether members of a Louisiana family could sue each other in tort. Unlike Louisiana, Mississippi
had a rule of intra-family immunity that prohibited such suits. The court reasoned that Mississippi's
rule was designed to protect Mississippi families from discord, and, since Jagers did not involve a
Mississippi family, that state's family-protecting policies would not be seriously affected if its law
were not applied to this case. The actual language used by the court was that "[i]t would not advance
any policy of the place of the tort to apply its law." Id. at 313. On the other hand, Louisiana's
policy of assuring compensation of injured persons, reflected in the absence of a rule of intra-family
immunity, would be seriously affected if Louisiana law were not applied to protect one Louisiana
domiciliary who had been injured-albeit in another state-by another Louisiana domiciliary. The
court said that not to apply Louisiana law "would defeat the policy the State of Louisiana continues
to have-to protect its citizens from damage from the wrongful acts of others." Id.
52. 508 So. 2d 928 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
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the same state and had an accident in another state. However, unlike Levy, the
common domicile in both of these cases was in the recovery state ("higher
standard"), Louisiana, while the accident was in the non-recovery state ("lower
standard"), Mississippi in Jagers and Hawaii in Hanzo. Thus, both these cases
fall within pattern # 1, rather than pattern #2 of the above table. Under interest
analysis, the methodology followed in Jagers,53 as well as under the Restate-
ment Second,54 cases falling within pattern # 1, that is, cases like Jagers and
Hanzo in which both parties are domiciled in a recovery state and have an
accident in a non-recovery state, are universally characterized as false conflicts
in which only the common-domicile state is interested in having its law applied.5
53. lagers, 276 So. 2d at 312-13. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
54. Before 1992, the approach of Louisiana courts to tort conflicts could be divided into two
steps. In the first step, the court would follow interest analysis and would try to determine whether
each of the states factually implicated in the dispute was actually "interested" in having its law
applied to the issue at hand. The court would do so by identifying for each state the purpose of, or
policy embodied in, the substantive rule of law that was claimed to be applicable. The court would
then determine whether, in light of the contacts of that state to the parties and the dispute, the
identified policy would be promoted by the application of the rule to the particular case. If the
answer was affirmative, that state would be deemed "interested." The same analysis would then be
repeated with the other state or states. If the other state was "not interested," the conflict would be
classified as a false conflict" and would be resolved by applying the law of the "interested" state.
If both states were "interested," then the conflict would be classified as a "true conflict." If neither
state was "interested," then the case would be classified as an "unprovided-for" case because no
solution was provided for it by interest analysis.
In both true conflicts and unprovided-for cases, the court would go through the second step of the
process. In this second step, the courts' improvising turned in.different directions. Some courts
continued to employ governmental interest analysis and simply applied the law of the forum. See,
e.g., Sutton v. Langley, 330 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 332 So. 2d 805 and 332 So.
2d 820 (La. 1976). Other courts switched to the Restatement Second which, generally speaking, calls
for the application of the law of the state having "the most significant relationship" to the parties and
the dispute and provides guidelines for identifying that state. See, inter alia, Sandefer Oil & Gas v.
AIG Oil Rig, Inc., 846 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. American Express Co., 593 F.2d 612 (5th
Cir. 1979); Brinkley & West, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1974); Ardoyno v.
Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. La. 1976). At least one case, Ardoyno (per Judge Rubin),
supplemented the use of the Restatement Second with an additional reliance on 'comparative
impairment," a methodology advanced by Professor William Baxter and followed by the California
courts. See William Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1963).
55. See Symeonides, supra note 29, at 715-16, 720. See also the leading American case on
this issue, Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (allowing a New York guest-passenger
to recover damages under New York law from her New York host-driver for injury received in
Ontario despite the fact that under Ontario's guest-statute the host-driver would be immune from
liability to his guest-passenger). For recent applications of this principle, see Forsman v. Forsman,
779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989) (A California woman was allowed to sue her husband under California
law for injuries she sustained in a traffic accident in Utah while riding as a passenger in his car.
Unlike California, Utah retains the rule of intra-family immunity.); Nelson v. Hix, 522 N.E.2d 1214,
(I11.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925, 109 S. Ct. 309 (1988) (Ontario law was applied, allowing recovery
for an Ontario woman injured in a traffic accident in Illinois while riding in a car driven by her
Ontario husband. At the time of the accident, Illinois, but not Ontario, prohibited interspousal suits.);
O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13 (Conn. 1986); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.
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However, again under interest analysis, cases that present the reverse fact-
law pattern (pattern # 2, above), like Levy, are not universally characterized as
false conflicts. In such cases the interests of the common domicile remains
undisputed, but the state of the accident is also considered by some courts as
having a certain interest stemming from the fact that its law provides recov-
ery.56 Using an automobile accident case as an example, interest analysts
contend that the accident/recovery state may have four distinct interests in
applying its law: (1) providing recovery for the victims of traffic accidents
occurring within the state; (2) ensuring that medical creditors who treated the
victim in the accident state will be compensated for their services; (3) deterring
negligent driving within its borders; and (4) ensuring that other defendants
involved in the accident will not have to shoulder a disproportionate share of
liability.
The first interest is rather weak since the victim is not a domiciliary of the
accident state and the impact of denial of recovery will not be felt there. The
second interest is somewhat stronger, but some courts tend to discount it in cases
in which the victim was not hospitalized in the accident state.57 The third
interest is also discounted on the ground that the absence of a guest statute or
other immunity.rule in the accident state does not affect the driver's conduct.
The degree of care exercised by the average driver does not increase or decrease
when that driver enters or exits a state with a guest statute.5s Finally, the fourth
interest may be present whenever the accident involves other tortfeasors
domiciled in the accident state and the contribution law of that state imposes on
1979); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38 (Del. 1991).
56. See, e.g., Sutton, 330 So. 2d at 327-28 (applying Louisiana law and allowing a Texas guest-
passenger to recover from her Texas host-driver and his insurer for injury suffered in a traffic
accident in Louisiana despite the fact that the Texas guest-statute would bar recovery); Milkovich v.
Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973) (following the "better-law approach" and refusing to apply
Ontario's guest-statute in a suit by an Ontario guest-passenger against his Ontario host-driver arising
out of a traffic accident in Minnesota which did not have a guest statute). See also Harold L. Korn,
The Choice of Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 772, 789-90. But see Schultz v. Boy
Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985) (applying the charitable immunity rule of New
Jersey, the state where the plaintiffs and one of the defendants were domiciled, rather than the law
of New York, the state where the wrongful conduct occurred, and which did not provide for
charitable immunity); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992); Chambers v. Dakotah
Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63 (S.D. 1992). The last three cases applied the law of the common
domicile even though that state had a "lower standard" than the state of conduct and injury. Schultz
did so by relying on the first "Neumeier rule" found in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y.
1972). That rule provides for the application of the law of the common domicile of the guest-
passenger and the host-driver whether or not that state provides for a higher or a lower standard than
the state of injury.
57. See, e.g., Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 686 ("no evidence that there are New York medical
creditors").
58. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 n.2 (Pa. 1970) ("that the accident occurred in
Delaware is not a relevant conduct because the Delaware statute does not set out a rule of the road");
See also Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 686 ("New York's deterrent interest is considerably less because none
of the parties is a resident and the rule in conflict is loss-allocating rather than conduct regulating.").
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them the share of damages that would have been paid by the host-driver who is
immunized by the application of the foreign guest statute.
Whenever the facts of a case trigger this fourth interest, the case cannot be
lightly characterized as a "false conflict," since the accident state does have a
certain interest in applying its law. However, this interest must be juxtaposed
to the interest of the common domicile whose guest statute may reflect a policy
of protecting host-drivers from suits by "ungrateful" guest-passengers; and/or
protecting insurers from guest-passengers acting in collusion with host-
passengers; and/or protecting insurers from this type of liability in order to keep
insurance premiums low. When, as in Levy, both the guest and the host are
domiciled in that state and the insurance policy was delivered there by an insurer
doing business in that state, that state has a legitimate and strong interest in
ensuring that its value judgments about loss allocation are followed. Whether
this interest should prevail over the interest of the accident state depends in part
on the methodology followed by the court. Courts following the Restatement
Second or a moderate version of interest analysis will likely apply the law of the
common domicile.59 Courts that follow the original version of interest analysis
purport to avoid a weighing of interests and resort to the application of the law
of the forum, whether it be the accident state or the common domicile.'
The only Louisiana court that was faced with this type of case was the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Sutton v. Langley.6' Sutton, which was
almost identical to Levy, arose out of a Louisiana accident involving a host-
driver and his guest-passenger from Texas, a state that, like Alabama in Levy,
had a guest statute. Applying interest analysis, Sutton refused to apply the Texas
guest statute on the ground that Louisiana's interests "must outweigh the Texas
59. See, e.g., Schultz, 480 N.E.2d 679, Hataway, 830 S.W.2d 53, and Chambers, 488 N.W.2d
63. The Schultz court offered the following reasons for applying the law of the common domicile
even in cases where that state, unlike the state of injury, denies recovery:
First, it significantly reduces forum-shopping opportunities, because the same law will be
applied by the common-domicile and locus jurisdictions, the two most likely forums.
Second, it rebuts charges that the forum-locus is biased in favor of its own laws and in
favor of rules permitting recovery. Third, the concepts of mutuality and reciprocity support
consistent application of the common-domicile law. In any given case, one person could
be either plaintiff or defendant and one State could be either the parties' common domicile
or the locus, and yet the applicable law would not change depending on their status.
Finally, it produces a rule that is easy to apply and brings a modicum of predictability and
certainty to an area of the law needing both.
Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 686-87.
60. See Robert A. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial
Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 975 (1977) and cases cited therein. Professor
Sedler summarizes these cases as follows: "When two parties from a nonrecovery state are involved
in an accident in a recovery state, the courts are divided, with the majority view being that the forum
should apply its law allowing recovery." Id. at 1035 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
61. 330 So. 2d 321, 327-28 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 332 So. 2d 805, 820 and 333 So.
2d 242 (La. 1976).
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interests. '62  The court's analysis left much to be desired. For example, the
above conclusion of the Sutton court was based, at least in part, on the fact that
the plaintiffs were "gut-of-state residents [who] voluntarily chose Louisiana
courts as the forum in which to assert their [claims]. 63 To be sure, as any
competent plaintiff's lawyer knows, it is a much better strategy to file in a state
with favorable law than in a state with unfavorable law. While this is a
legitimate consideration for the plaintiff, it is not a permissible consideration for
the court's decision of whether to apply forum law. It would be amazing if the
plaintiff's unilateral choice of a forum and his self-serving preference for its law
were elevated into an independent choice of law factor generating a state interest
in applying that law.64 Moreover, the Sutton court misread Texas' interests
when it reasoned that the policy embodied in the Texas guest statute, "pro-
tect[ing] liability insurance companies against claims brought by guests in
collusion with their host," was "primarily concerned only with suits brought in
the guest passenger states ....,65 Surely, however, the strength and pertinence
of a state policy cannot depend on where the lawsuit is filed and cannot be
neutralized by the mere fact that a plaintiff who does not like that policy has
chosen to file his lawsuit outside of that state.
The Sutton court was closer to the mark when it assumed that the involve-
ment of certain Louisiana defendants in the same accident might give Louisiana
a certain interest in applying its law for their protection. As the Sutton court
noted, these "Louisiana domiciliaries who are defendants in this case could be
adversely affected by the [application of foreign law] by limiting the fund from
which plaintiffs claims are to be satisfied." 66  Levy was similar in that, in
addition to the Alabama driver, two Louisiana parties and their insurer who were
also sued by the Alabama plaintiff. However, as said earlier, it is a different
question whether this factor is sufficient to tip the balance in favor of Louisiana
law. Although the Levy court did not expressly consider this question, its
ultimate conclusion to the contrary is consistent with the pre-1992 jurisprudence,
62. Id. at 327.
63. Id.
64. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 820, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2978-79 (1985)
("[A] plaintiff's desire for forum law is rarely, if ever controlling. In most cases the plaintiff shows
his obvious wish for forum law by filing there. 'If a plaintiff could choose the substantive rules to
be applied to an action ... the invitation to forum shopping would be irresistible."') (quoting Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 337, 101 S. Ct. 633, 652 (1981)).
65. Sutton, 330 So. 2d at 327.
66. Id. at 328. This statement is used by the court in support of its conclusion, also
questionable for other reasons, not to apply Texas' automobile insurance law. However, a similar
statement also appears in the court's discussion of the Texas guest statute: "Louisiana governmental
interest in governing awards of victims of accidents occurring on its highways and, more importantly,
.involving other Louisiana residents, must outweigh the Texas interests . Id, at 327 (emphasis
added).
1994]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
with the exception of Sutton. It is also consistent with Article 3444 of the new
law which adopts a solution contrary to Sutton.67
Returning to the Levy case, the Levy court held that, since "there is a
genuine issue of material fact whether Levy's [the Alabama host-driver's]
misconduct was willful or wanton under Alabama law so as to allow recovery
against him by his guest-passenger,"' the insurer's request for a summary
judgment was properly denied. Thus, barring an out of court settlement, the
issue of whether the Alabama driver's conduct was willful or wanton can be
expected to be litigated at the trial court. The above quoted statement might be
taken as an instruction to the trial court to apply Alabama law to that issue. Such
an instruction, however, should be clarified and qualified.
The question of whether a tortfeasor's conduct raises to a certain level of
blameworthiness is an issue "pertaining to standards of conduct and safety" and
is therefore governed by Article 3543 of the new law. The driver's conduct of
driving through a red light is prohibited by a Louisiana "rule of the road"
designed to regulate conduct and safety in Louisiana. Under the first paragraph
of Article 3543, the applicable law would be the law of Louisiana, since both the
driver's conduct and the passenger's injury occurred in that state. 69 Alabama
has no claim to apply its conduct regulation law to conduct confined exclusively
within Louisiana. For example, if one of Alabama's "rules of the road" prohibits
a driver from turning right on a red light, but Louisiana's corresponding rule
permits him to do so, Alabama would have no claim to apply its rule to driving
in Louisiana. Even if failure to follow that rule in Alabama is considered willful
and wanton conduct by Alabama courts, such a determination should not be
applied to conduct occurring in Louisiana and not considered negligent in
Louisiana.
On the other hand, the legal consequences that attach to a factual finding of
"willful or wanton conduct" under the law of the place of conduct may well be
an issue of loss distribution which is to be governed by Article 3544. For
example, if the trial court finds that, under Louisiana law applicable under
Article 3543, the Alabama driver's conduct in driving through a red light was
tantamount to "willful or wanton conduct," then the consequences of such a
finding may be determined under Alabama law, which is applicable to the loss
distribution issues of the guest-host dispute under Article 3544.70
67. For the reasons, see Symeonides, supra note 29, at 721. Nevertheless the question posed
in the text is an appropriate one to ask in determining whether to apply the escape clause of Article
3547. See id. at 763-66.
68. Levy v. Jackson, 612 So. 2d 894, 897 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (on rehearing).
69. See La. Civ. Code art. 3543, 1, and cases # I and # 2 in table 2, infra at text following
note 76.
70. For a Louisiana case that contains a similar distinction, see Brown v. DSI Transports, Inc.,
496 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986). Brown arose out of an accident in Alabama involving
Texas and Louisiana parties. Applying Alabama law, the lower court found the defendant negligent,
but also assigned to the plaintiff a certain percentage of fault. The court of appeal affirmed and
approved of that application, saying that, with regard to the issue of the applicable standard of care,
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b. Issues of Conduct and Safety
Two federal district court cases decided since the passage of the new law,
Coar v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.7 and Medx, Inc. v. Ranger,"
involve application of Article 3543, which deals with "[i]ssues pertaining to
standards of conduct and safety."73 Based on the premise that the rules that
establish these standards are territorially oriented,74 Article 3543 discounts the
parties' domicile as a connecting factor and focuses instead on the place of
conduct and the place of injury.7" The operation of Article 3543 has been
explained in detail elsewhere and has been illustrated with the following
table.76
there was "no conflict" because Alabama was the only interested state and that the other two states
could not interject their standard of care rules. However, the court distinguished this issue from the
issue of the impact on plaintiffs recovery of the fault assigned to him under Alabama law. Under
Alabama's contributory negligence rule, any fault by the plaintiff could diminish his recovery to zero,
while under Louisiana's and Texas' comparative negligence law, the plaintiffs fault could simply
reduce his recovery in proportion to the percentage of his fault. Without using the terminology of
loss distribution, the court of appeal recognized that the issue of assigning legal consequences to fault
already adjudged under the law of the state of the accident was an issue that concerned the accident
state very little, but interested the state where the parties were domiciled very much.
71. Civ. A. No. 92-357, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19713 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 1992).
72. Civ. A. No. 91-3099, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 850 (E.D. La., Jan. 21, 1993).
73. For an explanation of the meaning of this term, see Symeonides, supra note 29, at 699-705.
For a slightly narrower definition, see Weintraub, Approach to Choice of Law, supra note 44, at 715-
17.
74. See Symeonides, supra note 29, at 703-05.
75. The full text of Article 3543 is as follows:
Article 3543. Issues of conduct and safety. Issues pertaining to standards of conduct
and safety are governed by the law of the state in which the conduct that caused the injury
occurred, if the injury occurred in that state or in another state whose law did not provide
for a higher standard of conduct.
In all other cases, those issues are governed by the law of the state in which the injury
occurred, provided that the person whose conduct caused the injury should have foreseen
its occurrence in that state.
The preceding paragraph does not apply to cases in which the conduct that caused the
injury occurred in this state and was caused by a person who was domiciled in, or had
another significant connection with, this state. These cases are governed by the law of this
state.
76. See Symeonides, supra note 29, at 706. In this table, the second and third columns
represent the place of the conduct (C) and the injury (I), respectively. The next two columns
represent the domicile of the "injured person" or plaintiff (P) and the "person who caused the injury"
or defendant (D), respectively. The use of a capital letter in a particular column indicates that the
state represented by that letter prescribes a "higher standard" of conduct than a state represented by
a lower-case letter. The symbol "-" indicates that the identity or the law of the state represented by
that column is inconsequential. The next column shows the applicable paragraph of Article 3543,
while the last shows the law designated as applicable by that article.
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TABLE 2
(The application of Art. 3543 to issues of conduct and safety)I i
# C I P D Applicable I of Applicable Law
Art. 3544
1 A A I I AI .. ........ .......... ......... -. ..... ........... ........... ............... ........ ............  ......... *......
2 a a -1 a
3 A B - 1A..... ..... I ...... I ...................    IA .....
4 a b - i a
5 A b 1 A
6 a B 1[ 2 B if "foreseeable"
7 La. B La. 3 i La.
As illustrated by this table, the first paragraph of Article 3543 subjects to the
law of the place of conduct: (a) cases in which the conduct and the injury occurred
in the same state (see cases in patterns # 1 and # 2); and (b) cases in which the
conduct and the injury occurred in different states, and in which (i) the two states
prescribe the same standards of conduct and safety (see patterns # 3 and # 4); or (ii)
the state of the injury "does not provide for a higher standard," i.e., it provides for
a lower standard than the state of conduct (see pattern # 5). "[A]Il other cases"
(i.e., other than those provided by the first paragraph), are cases in which the
conduct and injury occur in different states and in which the particular conduct does
not violate the "lower" standards of the state of conduct but does violate the
"higher" standards of the state of injury (see pattern # 6). For these cases, the
second paragraph of Article 3543 authorizes the application of the law of the state
of injury, but only if the tortfeasor should have foreseen the occurrence of the
injury in that state. However, the application of the second paragraph is negated
by the third paragraph of the Article in those cases in which the injurious conduct
occurred in Louisiana and was engaged in by "a person who was domiciled in, or
had another significant connection with [Louisiana]."" In such cases, the third
paragraph authorizes the application of Louisiana law to such a conduct, even when
the injury caused by it occurs in another state whose law imposes a "higher
standard" of conduct. These cases fall within pattern # 7.
Coar v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.78 arose out of the crash in
Alabama of a small airplane owned by L'Express, a Louisiana airline company.
Plaintiffs were the parents of an eleven-year-old child who allegedly sustained
77. La. Civ. Code art. 3543, 3.
78. Civ. A. No. 92-357, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19713 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 1992).
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mental distress after witnessing the crash and its immediate aftermath. The place
of the conduct that caused the accident was disputed. If the crash was caused by
pilot error or similar substandard conduct in the operation of the aircraft just prior
to the crash, that conduct would have occurred in Alabama. On the other hand, if
the crash was caused by substandard maintenance of the aircraft, that conduct
would have occurred in Louisiana, defendant's home base. Quoting the pertinent
comment to Article 3543, the court said correctly that the factual issue of which
conduct caused the injury should be determined under the causation principles of
the law of the forum and reserved judgment on this issue until trial on the merits.
However, the court misspoke when it said that "[o]nce it determined which
negligent act, if any, caused the accident, the law of the state of that conduct will
be applied to the remaining issues in the case."79 In fact, the comment from which
the court is quoting provides that "[flollowing such a determination, the case will
be governed by either the law of the state of that conduct or the law of the state of
injury, depending on which paragraph of this Article [3543] is applicable .... go
Be that as it may, the plaintiffs in Coar asserted three causes of action: (a)
emotional distress from viewing injury to another ("bystander recovery"); (b)
intentional infliction of emotional distress ("outrage"); and (c) negligent infliction
of emotional distress.
On the first cause of action, Louisiana and Alabama law would produce the
same result. Louisiana does not provide a cause of action for one who suffers
mental anguish as a result of witnessing the physical injury of another, unless the
injured person is a close relative of the plaintiff." Alabama does not recognize
such a cause of action under any circumstance. Since the plaintiff was not related
to any of the victims of the crash, he could not recover under the law of either state.
This classic false conflict would fall into pattern # 2, if the injurious conduct
occurred in Alabama, or into pattern # 4, if the conduct occurred in Louisiana. In
either case, the result on the issue of bystander recovery would be the same.
The same was true with regard to the plaintiff's second cause of action.
Although both Louisiana and Alabama provide a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff could not prevail because there was no
indication that L'Express recklessly or intentionally inflicted emotional distress
upon him, or that it engaged in behavior to be regarded "as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized society."82 Here again, this case would fall into pattern
# I or pattern # 3, depending on where the critical conduct occurred. Either way,
however, the result would be the same. Again, it is immaterial which state law
applies to this classic false conflict.
Regarding the plaintiff' s third cause of action, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the court quoted from pertinent Louisiana jurisprudence recognizing that
79. Id. at *3.
80. La. Civ. Code art. 3543, Reporter's cmt. (h) (emphasis added).
81. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
82. Coar, at *5 (citing a Louisiana and an Alabama case).
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a person who suffers no physical harm may recover for mental anguish resulting
from fear or fright over his own well being only if he is in the "zone of danger" and
reasonably believes himself to be in danger.83 The court reserved decision on this
factual question until trial on the merits. The court then discussed Alabama law and
concluded that such a cause of action is in principle available under that law, but
asked the parties to submit briefs describing the conditions and limitations for
recovery.84 The court also announced its intention to select the applicable law
under Article 3543 as follows:
(1) Alabama law will apply if the conduct causing the injury
occurred in Alabama.
(2) Alabama law will apply if the conduct causing the injury
occurred in a state other than Louisiana or Alabama.
(3) Louisiana law will apply if the conduct causing the injury
occurred in Louisiana.
85
The correctness of these statements, and the very existence of a conflict of
laws, depend: (a) on the precise content of Alabama law on the issue of negligent
infliction of emotional distress; and (b) on the resolution of certain factual
questions, such as whether the injurious conduct occurred in Alabama or Louisiana
and whether the victim was in fact within the "zone of danger." In any event, the
court's statement (1) is correct. Indeed, since the alleged injury could only occur
in Alabama, a finding that the injurious conduct also occurred in that state would
mean that the case would fit into pattern # I or # 2 of the above table. In such a
case, Alabama law will apply under the first paragraph of Article 3543.
The court's statement (3) is also correct. A factual finding that the conduct that
caused the injury occurred in Louisiana would mean that the case would fall into
any one of patterns # 3-# 5 or pattern # 7 of the above table. Which of these
patterns is applicable will depend on the resolution of the legal question of what
Alabama law provides on this issue, as well as on the factual question of whether
the plaintiff was within the "zone of danger." If Alabama law on this issue is
identical to Louisiana's, the case would fall into pattern # 3, and Louisiana law will
be applicable under the first paragraph of Article 3543. If Alabama law on this
issue provides for a "lower standard" than Louisiana, the case would fall into
pattern # 5, and Louisiana law will be applicable under the same paragraph of
Article 3543. In both cases, the plaintiff's recovery will depend on whether the
plaintiff is found to be "within the zone of danger." Finally, if Alabama law on this
issue provides for a "higher standard" than Louisiana, then the case would fall into
pattern # 7 because of the defendant's "significant connection"86 with Louisiana.
83. Id. at *6-7.
84. Id. at *8.
85. Id. at *6.
86. La. Civ. Code art. 3543, 3.
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In such a case, Louisiana law will be applicable under the third paragraph of Article
3543.
However, the court's statement (2) is partly incorrect. For example, if it turns
out that the negligent conduct occurred in a third state, Texas, then, under the first
paragraph of Article 3543, the law of Texas, not Alabama, would be applicable to
this issue if Texas' standards are either the same or higher than those of Alabama
(patterns # 3-# 5). The only case in which Alabama law will apply under this
scenario is a case that fits into pattern # 6, covered by the second paragraph of
Article 3543; namely, only if Alabama has a higher standard than Texas and it is
proven that the defendant should have foreseen the occurrence of the injury in
Alabama, will Alabama law apply.
The second case involving Article 3543 is Medx, Inc. v. Ranger.87 In Ranger,
a Florida corporation filed suit against two Louisiana domiciliaries and a Texas
corporation for tortious interference with contract. Defendants were accused of
improperly competing with plaintiff by interfering with plaintiffs contract with a
Louisiana domiciliary and attempting to take away some of plaintiffs Louisiana
customers. Under the circumstances of this case, such a cause of action would be
available to plaintiff under Florida law, but not under Louisiana law. The court
assumed without discussion that the applicable conflicts article is Article 3543,
applied Louisiana law, and denied the action. The court found that this case
"involve[d] conduct occurring in Louisiana which was committed by persons...
domiciled, or at least having a significant connection with, Louisiana."88 If this
finding is correct, then the court was also correct in holding that, under Article
3543, Louisiana law would be applicable regardless of whether the plaintiff's injury
occurred in Louisiana or Florida. Indeed, if the injury occurred in Louisiana, the
case would fall into pattern # 2 of the above table, and the application of Louisiana
law would be proper under the first paragraph of Article 3543. If the injury
occurred in Florida, the case would fall into pattern # 7, and the application of
Louisiana law would be proper under the third paragraph of Article 3543.89
c. Products Liability and Punitive Damages
Two almost identical cases decided during the survey period involve the
availability of punitive damages in products liability actions under Article 3545 of
the new law. Article 3545 provides in part that "[d]elictual and quasi-delictual
liability for injury caused by a product, as well as damages, whether compensatory,
special, or punitive, are governed by the law of this state: (1) when the injury was
sustained in this state by a person domiciled or residing in this state."'9 The
application of this article and the history of the italicized phrase, inserted during the
87. Civ. A. No. 91-3099, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 850 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 1993).
88. Id. at *12.
89. Since the parties apparently did not invoke the escape clause of Article 3547, the court
cannot be blamed for not discussing its applicability.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 3545 (emphasis added).
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debate on the Senate floor, have been explained in detail elsewhere." Jefferson
Parish Hospital Service District #2 v. W.R. Grace & Co.92 and Orleans Parish
School Board v. United States Gypsum Co.93 fit precisely within the above quoted
part of Article 3544. In both cases, an asbestos-containing product caused injury
in Louisiana to a person domiciled in Louisiana. In both cases, the product was
manufactured outside Louisiana in states whose law apparently provides punitive
damages in such cases. The court applied Louisiana law and denied punitive
damages in both cases. This result follows from a straight-forward application of
the Article 3545. 94
The only remaining question is whether these cases are good candidates for
applying the escape clause of Article 3547.95 This article allows the court to
deviate from the result dictated by the application of Articles 3543-3546 if, from
the totality of the circumstances of an exceptional case, it is clearly evident under
the principles of Article 3542, that the.policies of [a] state [other than the one
whose law is applicable under these articles] would be more seriously impaired if
its law were not applied to the particular issue. 6 As explained elsewhere, it is
perfectly appropriate to invoke this clause in cases such as the ones at hand and, if
the clause is found applicable, to award punitive damages under a foreign law in a
products case that is otherwise governed by Louisiana law under Article 3545.
91. See Symeonides, supra note 29, 749-59.
92. Civ. A. No. 92-0891, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962 (E.D. La. June 30, 1992).
93. Civ. A. No. 89-0070, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792 (E.D. La. June 7, 1993). This case was
decided primarily under the old law. However, the court also discussed the new law and concluded
that the same result would follow under the new law.
94. The Jefferson court properly reserved judgment on whether a different result might obtain
if the complaint could be construed to demand punitive damages on any theory apart from product
liability. Jefferson, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962, at *8 n.3. For an action cumulating contractual
and delictual causes of action for damage caused to a product, see Gulf States Utils. Co. v. NEI
Peebles Elec. Prods., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. La. 1993) (concluding that Louisiana law applied
under Articles 3537, 3542, and 3545 which govern, respectively, conventional obligations, products
liability, and tort actions in general).
95. For a detailed explanation of the meaning and application of this article, see Symeonides,
supra note 29, at 763-66. For a critique, see Weintraub, Contributions of Symeonides and Kozyris,
supra note 44.
96. La. Civ. Code art. 3547. The full text of the article is as follows:
Article 3547. Exceptional Cases. The law applicable under articles 3543-46 shall not
apply if, from the totality of the circumstances of an exceptional case, it is clearly evident
under the principles of Article 3542, that the policies of another state would be more
seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue. In such event the
law of the other state shall apply.
97. See Symeonides, supra note 29, at 759.
It should not be forgotten that, like any other clause of Article 3545, the reference to
punitive damages contained therein is subject to the escape clause of Article 3547, which,
moreover, operates on an issue-by-issue basis. An earlier effort to amend Article 3546
so as to prohibit the award of punitive damages in all products liability cases governed
by Louisiana law and to prevent the application of the escape clause of Article 3547 was
unsuccessful. When the amendment to Article 3545 was proposed and accepted. it was
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In both cases, the plaintiffs invoked the escape clause but were unable to persuade
the court that the conditions for the applying the clause were satisfied.
The Jefferson court quoted this author's statement that the insertion by the
Council of the Law Institute of words "exceptional case" and "clearly evident" in
Article 3547 was specifically intended to limit the article's application to "ensure
that Article 3547 would not end up swallowing Articles 3543-3546."' However,
the court failed to notice that in the next sentence the quoted author states that
"'exceptional' need not be confined to extraordinary or statistically rare cases.
'Exceptional' might be any case in which most reasonable people would agree that
the policies of one state will be significantly more impaired than those of the state
whose law is designated as applicable by Articles 3543-3546." 99 This of course
is a matter for judicial determination,'0° and, on balance, both courts may be
correct in concluding that the escape should not apply. However, the reasons
advanced for this conclusion call for further discussion.
The Jefferson court supported its conclusion by relying on two cases decided
under the old law. The first case, Pittman v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp.,t0t recognized that Louisiana's interest in denying punitive damages "lies
in the protection of its judicial system, rather than domestic defendants, from what
it might consider inherently speculative awards."' 2 Indeed, this is a legitimate
interest but not one that should automatically prevail in every case that comes
before a Louisiana court. To begin with, since 1984, this interest in "protecting the
judicial system" has been subordinated by the Louisiana Legislature in all cases
involving injury caused by the handling of hazardous substances or drunk
driving. 10 3 Secondly, in conflicts cases decided under the old conflicts law, this
interest has been subordinated in as many cases"° as it has been honored.'0 5
clear that it would remain subject to the escape clause of Article 3547.
Id.
98. Jefferson, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962 (quoting Symeonides, supra note 29, at 766).
99. Symeonides, supra note 29, at 766.
100. Id.
101. 559 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 563 So. 2d 885 (La. 1990).
102. Id. at 883, quoted in Jefferson, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962 at *6. A similar statement is
found in Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States Gypsum Co., Civ. A. No. 89-0070, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7792, *3 (E.D. La. June 30, 1992).
103. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.3 and 2315.4, enacted by 1984 La. Acts No. 335, § I
(amended by 1990 Acts No. 302, § 1) and 1984 La. Acts No. 511, § 1.
104. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982)
(imposing punitive damages on one Louisiana defendant and on three foreign defendants for injury
sustained in Mississippi and Kentucky caused by conduct in Louisiana and Mississippi); Cooper v.
American Express Co., 593 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1979) (awarding punitive damages under Alabama law
against a Louisiana defendant who acted in Louisiana and caused intentional injury in Alabama to
a plaintiff domiciled there); Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. La. 1976) (imposing punitive
damages under Mississippi law on a Mississippi defendant for conduct in Mississippi that caused
injury in Louisiana to a Louisiana domiciliary).
105. In addition to Pinman, 559 So. 2d 879, see Lee v. Ford Motor Co., 457 So. 2d 193 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 461 So. 2d 319 (La. 1984); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co.,
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Thirdly, this interest has been expressly subordinated by the Louisiana Legislature
by enacting Article 3546 which expressly allows a Louisiana court to award
punitive damages in certain cases.'06
In articulating the interest of the state where the product was manufactured, the
Jefferson court again quoted Pittman:
California [the state of manufacture] has an interest in preventing
manufacturers within its boundaries from placing defective products in the
stream of commerce. California's punitive damage law, if applied in this
case, would serve to deter a California manufacturer such as Kaiser from
placing defective wiring into the stream of commerce. 107
This is a good articulation of the interest of the state of manufacture and is
consistent with the general philosophy of the new law, especially Articles 3543 and
3546.
However, the Jefferson court also quotes a conflicting statement from Ramsey
v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.:10 8 "The policy of deterrence reflected in such an
award [of punitive damages] ultimately seeks the protection of Texas [the state of
manufacture] citizens against injury, and does not automatically translate into an
interstate policy designed to punish its own manufacturing citizens for allegedly
causing injury elsewhere. ''1°9
409 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. La. 1976). In all three cases, the court applied Louisiana law and denied
punitive damages for injury caused by a foreign product in Louisiana to a Louisiana domiciliary.
These cases are identical to the two cases discussed in the text and were decided the same way.
However, nothing suggests that Louisiana's alleged interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial
system from punitive damages is any greater in products cases than in non-product cases. See infra
text accompanying notes 108-114, discussing Ramsey v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 704 F. Supp.
1381, 1382-83 (E.D. La. 1989).
106. La. Civ. Code art. 3546 provides as follows:
Article 46. Punitive damages. Punitive damages may not be awarded by a court of this
state unless authorized:
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct occurred and by either the law
of the state where the resulting injury occurred or the law of the place where the person
whose conduct caused the injury was domiciled; or
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and by the law of the state
where the person whose conduct caused the injury was domiciled.
For a detailed discussion of the meaning and application of this article, see Symeonides, supra note
29, at 735-49. The Jefferson court was correct in concluding that Article 3546 was inapplicable
because it was displaced by the more specific article, Article 3545. Indeed, with regard to punitive
damages in products cases falling within its scope, Article 3545 is more specific than Article 3546
which applies to punitive damages in non-products cases and in products cases not "disposed of" by
Article 3545.
107. Jefferson Parish Hospital Service District #2 v. W.R. Grace & Co., Civ. A. No. 92-0891,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962, *5 (E.D. La. June 30, 1992) (quoting Pittman, 559 So. 2d at 883).
108. 704 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. La. 1989).
109. Id. at 1382-83, quoted in Jefferson, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962, at *7, and Orleans Parish
Sch. Bd. v. United States Gypsum Co., Civ. A. No. 89-0070, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792, at *3
(E.D. La. June 30, 1992).
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Although seemingly plausible, this statement is inconsistent with the
philosophy of the new law. As evidenced by Articles 3543 and 3546, the new law
is based on the assumption that, for matters of conduct and safety in general and for
punitive damages in particular, the domicile of the plaintiff is not a relevant
factor."0 Moreover, the above statement is inconsistent with another statement
found in Ramsey and quoted by Jefferson: "Louisiana has a clear interest in a
Louisiana accident involving a Louisiana resident."' 1.. The Louisiana resident
referred to in Ramsey, the plaintiff, was injured by a defective product manufac-
tured in Texas. It is incongruous to assert, as the Ramsey court does, that, Texas'
domestic policy of punishing negligent manufactures does not "translate into an
interstate policy designed to punish its own manufacturing citizens,"" 2 but
Louisiana's domestic policy against punitive damages somehow does "translate into
an interstate policy""' 3 of depriving its citizen from such damages. In other
words, if Texas' policy of deterring the negligent manufacture of defective products
in Texas somehow stops at the Texas border and does not reach out-of-state injuries
caused by such manufacturing, why is it that Louisiana's policy of protecting
manufacturers from punitive damages somehow operates extraterritorially to
protect out-of-state manufacturer's who are not even protected by the law of their
own state. The Ramsey court's statements can be understood only if one assumes:
(a) that Texas' rule imposing punitive damages is not really designed to deter
negligent conduct, but rather to reward the victims of such conduct; and (b) that
Louisiana's prohibition of punitive damages is not really designed to protect
defendants but rather to punish victims who dare ask for such damages. Obviously,
such assumptions would be erroneous, but they might enable a court applying the
most extreme version of interest analysis to conclude that, in a case like Ramsey,
Texas would not want to reward non-Texas victims, while Louisiana would want
to punish Louisiana victims. It is submitted that neither of the above assumptions
nor the resulting conclusion can be reconciled with the letter and spirit of the new
law.
The above criticism is confined to the Ramsey case. This author does not
necessarily disagree with the conclusion of the Jefferson and Orleans Parish cases
that the plaintiffs did not carry the burden of persuasion for applying the escape
clause of Article 3547. However, the Ramsey case is not good authority for that
conclusion or for applying the new conflicts law, including Article 3547. First,
Ramsey is based on a philosophy that is repudiated by, or is inconsistent with the
new law. Second, Ramsey is not a good authority for Louisiana courts for another
reason: it was decided under federal law rather than Louisiana conflicts law.
Jurisdiction in that case was based on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
("OCSLA") which calls for the application of the "civil and criminal laws of each
110. See Symeonides, supra note 29, at 705, 736.
111. Ramsey, 704 F. Supp. at 1383, quoted in Jefferson, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962, at *7.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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adjacent state" to cases falling within the scope of the Act. The Ramsey court
specifically held that, as interpreted by applicable Supreme Court precedent,
OCSLA does not incorporate the choice-of-law rules of the adjacent state; the Act
calls for the application of only the substantive law of the adjacent state. 114
Because the accident in Ramsey occurred in the Louisiana part of the continental
shelf, Louisiana was the "adjacent state" and its law was applied on that ground,
i.e., as a matter of federal statutory choice, not as matter of judicial choice under
state law. Unfortunately, the court further opined that the same result would follow
under Louisiana's choice-of-law jurisprudence. That opinion, however, was merely
a dictum, and not a well-reasoned one at that.
2. Contract Conflicts
As of the time of this writing, no contract conflict cases applying the new law
have been decided by Louisiana appellate courts. However, two such cases have
been decided by federal district courts sitting in diversity, 1 5 and both involve
Article 3537, the general and residual article on contract conflicts." 6 Before
discussing these cases, it may be helpful to describe the approach of this arti-
cle.1
1 7
114. Id. at 1382.
115. See First Alabama Bank v. Baber, Civ. A. No. 92-1662, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13977
(E.D. La. Sept. 16, 1992), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 121-128; Thomas v. Amoco
Oil Co., 815 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. La. 1993), discussed at infra text accompanying notes 129-151.
See also Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 611 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) and Rice,
Fowler, Kingsmill, Vance, Flint & Booth v. J.A.R., Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3298, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9353 (E.D. La. June 30, 1993) (containing a passing reference to the new law). For other contract
conflicts rendered after the effective date of the new law but decided under the old law, see Em
Nominee Partnership Co. v. Arkla Energy Resources, 615 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993);
Ankum v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-2990, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16203 (E.D. La.
Oct. 21, 1992); Radiophone, Inc. v. Pricellular Corp., Civ. A. No. 91-4306, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17007 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 1992); Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, Civ. A. No. 86-4242, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12795 (E.D. La. Aug. 20, 1992). In addition, see the following insurance conflicts,
also decided under the old law: Willett v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 966 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 1992); Dugger v. Upledger Inst., 795 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. La. 1992); Kadan v. Commercial
Ins. Co., 800 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. La. 1992).
116. La. Civ. Code art. 3537 provides:
Article 3537. General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this Title, an issue of
conventional obligations is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most
seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant
policies of the involved states in the light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the
parties and the transaction, including the place of negotiation, formation, and performance
of the contract, the location of the object of the contract, and the place of domicile,
habitual residence, or business of the parties; (2) the nature, type, and purpose of the
contract; and (3) the policies referred to in Article 3515, as well as the policies of
facilitating the orderly planning of transactions, of promoting multistate commercial
intercourse, and of protecting one party from undue imposition by the other.
117. The description of the approach of Article 3537 draws heavily from the Reporter's
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The first paragraph of this article enunciates the objective of the choice-of-law
process for contract conflicts in language that is purposefully identical to that of the
first paragraph of Article 3515, the article that enunciates the overall philosophy of
the new law."' As in Article 3515, the objective is to identify "the state whose
policies would be most seriously impaired," that is, the state that, in light of its
connection to the parties and the transaction and its interests implicated in the
conflict, would bear the most serious legal, social, economic, and other conse-
quences "if its law were not applied" to the issue at hand. As envisioned by Article
3537, the search for the applicable law should not be a mechanical, quantitative
process. It should be based on an objective and impartial evaluation of the
consequences of the choice-of-law decision on each of the involved states with a
view towards accommodating their respective interests, rather than selfishly
promoting the interests of one state at the expense of the others.
The second paragraph of Article 3537 prescribes the process or method for
attaining the objective enunciated in the first paragraph in language that is parallel
to, though more specific than, the language used in the second paragraph of Article
3515."9 Article 3537 adds specificity to the description of this process by:
providing an illustrative list of the factual contacts that are usually pertinent in
contract conflicts; 20 adding to the list of "policies mentioned in Article 3515"
certain sets of policies that are ex hypothesi pertinent in contract conflicts; and
comments to that article, including the use of verbatim excerpts from these comments without
quotation marks or other citations. It is believed that, since the Reporter and this author are the same
person, such use is permissible.
118. This approach is described in detail in Symeonides, supra note 29, at 692-96, and in
Symeonides, Les grands probl~mes, supra note 32, at 232-39.
119. This cross-reference to Article 3515 also incorporates by reference the analysis prescribed
by that article. The first step of the analysis is to identify "the relevant policies of the involved
states." A state is considered "involved" when it has any of the factual contacts expressly listed in
the second paragraph of this article or included by implication in the phrase "pertinent contacts." The
"relevant policies" of that state are identified through the resources of the interpretative process by
focusing on the specific rules of substantive contract law whose applicability is being urged in the
particular case. The second step of the process is to evaluate "the strength and pertinence of [these]
policies in the light of" the three sets of factors listed in the second paragraph, to wit: (i) the factual
contacts of each involved state to the parties and the transaction; (ii) the "nature, type and purpose
of the contract"; and (iii) the policies listed in clause (3).
120. This list is neither exhaustive nor hierarchical. It is intended to discourage rather than
encourage a mechanistic counting of contacts as a means of selecting the applicable law. That one
state has more contacts with the dispute than another state does not necessarily mean that the law of
the first state should be applied to any or all issues of the dispute, unless the contacts are of the kind
that implicate policies of that state that "would be most seriously impaired if its law were not
applied" to the issue at hand. For example, in a contract pertaining to immovables, the fact that the
"location of the object of the contract" is in one state may well be more important than all other
factual contacts of another state, if the particular issue in dispute is such as to implicate a strong
policy of the situs state concerning land utilization or security of land titles. Similarly, the place of
the performance of a contract would normally be more important than most other factual contacts
combined if the issue in dispute is the availability of specific performance and the contract is
considered immoral under the law of the place of performance.
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providing that the evaluation of the strength and pertinence of the involved policies
is to be made "in the light of ... the nature, type, and purpose of the contract."
Deliberately placed between the lists of factual contacts and multistate
considerations, the last quoted phrase should help orient the dialectical process of
evaluating the strength and pertinence of state policies. Indeed, the nature, type, or
purpose of the particular contract may provide useful pointers for assessing the
relative importance of factual contacts and the relative pertinence of multistate
considerations. For example, in a contract with family-law aspects (e.g., a child-
support agreement), the domicile of the parties would normally be more important
than any of the other factual contacts listed in clause (1), and the policy of
facilitating and promoting multistate commercial intercourse (clause 3) would be
far less relevant than any of the other multistate considerations listed in clause (3).
Similarly, in an employment contract, the place where the services were to be
rendered would usually be among the more important factual contacts, and the
policy of "protecting one party from undue imposition by the other" would acquire
particular significance. Finally, the latter policy would usually be more important
in small consumer contracts than in commercial contracts between parties with
equal bargaining power.
The first case applying Article 3537 is First Alabama Bank v. Baber."2' In
Baber, an Alabama bank sued a Louisiana debtor to collect on a loan secured by a
collateral mortgage on "operating interests" in land located in Louisiana. The court
drew the proper distinction between the law applicable to the mortgage, on the one
hand, and the law applicable to the loan contract, that also established the mortgage,
on the other. The court was also correct in concluding that while the law applicable
to the mortgage is determined through Article 3535 on real rights, the law
applicable to the loan contract is determined through Article 3537, the general
article on contract conflicts.'22 Since the only question before the court involved
the loan contract itself rather than the mortgage created by it, the court properly
applied Article 3537. Noting that the record did not contain sufficient facts for a
complete analysis of the choice-of-law question, the court found that the available
facts were nevertheless sufficient to sustain a conclusion that the contract was
governed by Louisiana law. The court noted that defendant was a Louisiana
resident doing business in Louisiana, that the contract's purpose was to provide the
defendant with operating capital for his Louisiana business, and that the operating
interests securing the various loans and advances were interests in land located in
Louisiana.'23 The court concluded that, except for the plaintiff bank's Alabama
locale, no other facts "outweigh those factors pointing to Louisiana as the
appropriate source of law."'2 "
121. Civ. A. No. 92-1662, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13977 (E.D. La. Sept. 18, 1992).
122. Id. at *4, relying on Reporter's comment (b) to La. Civ. Code art 3535.
123. Id. at *6.
124. Id.
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The court was right to complain that the record was sparse with facts from
which to decide the choice-of-law question. The court would have been equally
right to complain about the apparent lack of any reference in the parties' briefs to
the relevant policies of the two states. Without such reference, the choice-of-law
decision is bound to degenerate into a quantitative counting of contacts. The blame
for such a phenomenon would lie squarely upon the parties. Fortunately, the
court's decision was correct for an additional reason. The court quoted a clause in
the contract providing that the "[m]ortgagor does herein and hereby waive the three
day's notice of demand provided for by Article 2639 of the Code of Civil Procedure
of the State of Louisiana."' 25 The court saw in this clause evidence that "Louisi-
ana law was at least contemplated [by the parties] as the governing law.' 26 This
finding means that the application of Louisiana law would also be supported by
Article 3540, which provides that contractual issues other than capacity or form are
governed by the law "expressly chosen or clearly relied upon by the parties.' 27
Since the opposing party offered no evidence or argument to rebut this conclusion,
or to prove that the law of Alabama "would otherwise be applicable under Article
3537, '"28 the court's conclusion must be accepted as correct.
The second case applying Article 3537 is Thomas v. Amoco Oil Co.' 29
Thomas involved the validity of an indemnity agreement between Woodson, a
Louisiana construction company, and Amoco Oil Company, whose domicile is not
mentioned in the opinion; however, the court noted that Amoco is neither domiciled
in Louisiana nor in Texas, the other involved state. 30 The indemnity agreement
was contained in a contract calling for construction work by Woodson on an
Amoco owned land-based pipeline in Texas. The contract was negotiated via mail
and telephone conversations between Louisiana and Illinois, and was executed by
Woodson in Louisiana. The indemnity agreement would be invalid under the
Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act ("LOIA"),"' but only if the agreement is one
that "pertains to a well for oil, gas, or water."' 3 2 The court concluded that, since
Woodson failed to establish that the Woodson-Amoco agreement pertained to a gas
well,'33 the LOIA was inapplicable, and thus the indemnity agreement was
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. La. Civ. Code art. 3540 (emphasis added). This article provides in full as follows:
Article 3540. Party Autonomy. All other issues of conventional obligations are governed
by the law expressly chosen or clearly relied upon by the parties, except to the extent that
law contravenes the public policy of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable
under Article 3537.
128. La. Civ. Code art. 3540.
129. 815 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. La. 1993).
130. Id. at 187.
131. La. R.S. 9:2780 (1991).
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. The Amoco pipeline connected one of Amoco's Texas refineries to one of its terminals, and
transported butane to and from the refinery. The court noted that there was no sufficient nexus
between this pipeline and "a well" so as to bring this case within the scope of LOlA. Thomas, 815
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ultimately valid under Louisiana law. Apparently the agreement was also valid
under Texas law. Although the opinion contains no reference to Texas law, the
court eventually allowed Amoco to "pursue its contractual indemnity claim,"'
' 34
a decision that would be correct only if the agreement was valid under Texas
law. 135
If in fact the indemnity agreement was valid under the law of both states, there
would be no conflict and the court's whole discussion of the choice-of-law issue
would have been unnecessary. For example, the court's conclusion that "Louisiana
has a greater interest in enforcing its anti-indemnity statute than does Texas. Thus,
the policies behind Louisiana's indemnity law will be 'most seriously impaired' if
Louisiana law is not applied,"' 3 6 sounds hollow when one remembers that by its
own terms, Louisiana's "indemnity law" was actually inapplicable to the case at
hand. Similarly, the court's statement that "Louisiana's interest in protecting a
resident contractor is greater than Texas' interest in protecting a non-resident
contractor"'37 is equally meaningless when one remembers that neither state
would have actually protected the contractor in this case. Finally, the court's
assertion that "Texas suffers no impairment of its interests if Louisiana law is
applied... [because] Texas is merely the place of performance of the contract and
the location of the accident"'38 is a vast over-simplification. If the indemnity
agreement was valid under Texas law (either because the agreement did not fall
within the scope of its anti-indemnity statute or for any other reason), Texas would
have an interest in seeing to it that contracts for the performance of services in
Texas are faithfully performed. In this sense, the court's assertion that since
"[n]either party is domiciled in Texas ... [neither] should reasonably expect the
protection of the Texas indemnity statute"'39 is another simplification. On the
other hand, if the indemnity agreement was invalid under Texas law, Texas would
still be deemed to have an interest in applying its law to ensure safety at the
workplace by preventing the protection of the indemnitee from the consequences
of his own negligence.
Fortunately, as said earlier, the court's choice-of-law discussion was harmless
because the same result would follow regardless of which law one applies to this
"false conflict." Nevertheless, the above discussion serves to illustrate the dangers
encountered when one elevates state policies in the abstract, without relating those
policies to the facts of the case at hand. Whether one employs interest analysis, the
Restatement Second, or the new Louisiana conflicts law, one consideration remains
constant: A state does not have an interest in having its law applied just because
F. Supp. at 188.
134. Id. at 189.
135. Texas also has its own version of an oilfield anti-indemnity act, but that act, like the LOIA,
applies only to oilfield-related contracts.
136. Thomas, 815 F. Supp. at 187.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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it has some contacts with the transaction or the parties. A state is interested only
if its contacts with the transaction are such that applying its law to the case would
actually further the pertinent policies underlying that law. With this in mind, it
should be obvious that a state neither has an interest in applying a statute that is
actually inapplicable, nor in protecting a domiciliary who is actually not protected
by the statute.
3. Workers' Compensation Conflicts
Another aspect of Thomas that calls for some pause is the court's handling of
a workers' compensation issue. The case began with a tort suit filed by Thomas,
an employee of Woodson, who was injured by a gas explosion while working
within the course and scope of his employment for Woodson on Amoco's pipeline
in Texas. Amoco brought a third-party complaint against Woodson alleging that
plaintiff's injury was caused by Woodson's negligence and seeking defense and
indemnity for any amounts for which Amoco may be cast to pay Thomas. Shortly
before Thomas' claim was to go to trial, he settled with Amoco. Woodson sought
dismissal of Amoco's third-party complaint alleging that the workers' compensa-
tion laws of Texas and Louisiana bar Amoco's claim for contractual indemnity
under each law's "exclusive" remedy provisions. The court concluded that: (a) the
Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act was applicable to this issue; (b) the Act
"relieves an employer from the obligation to indemnify under the 'tort-indemnity'
theory";' O4 and (c) the Act does not preclude indemnification based on a contract
between the employer and the third party demanding indemnification.' 4' All
three conclusions are correct. However, the court's first conclusion on the
applicability of the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act calls for further
discussion.
The court assumed that this choice-of-law issue is governed by Article 3515,
the general and residual article of Book IV of the Civil Code. However, since this
article applies "except as otherwise provided in this Book,"'' 41 one should first
examine whether another more specific article in Book IV is applicable to the issue.
In that context, one should examine the applicability of the tort articles of Book IV,
or at least Article 3542. Secondly, since Book IV applies "unless otherwise
expressly provided by the law of this state,"'' 43 one should also determine whether
the particular choice-of-law issue is addressed by a more specific provision of
Louisiana legislation. In that inquiry, one should consider Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1035.1, the specific provision that defines the extraterritorial reach of
the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act. This provision authorizes the
extraterritorial application of the Act to injuries occurring outside Louisiana if at
140. Id. at 186-89.
141. Id. at 186.
142. La Civ. Code art. 3515.
143. La. Civ. Code art. 14. See supra discussion at note 31.
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the time of the injury the injured employee's employment is principally localized
in Louisiana or the employment contract was made in Louisiana.' Since
Thomas met both of these conditions, his recovery from his employer Woodson
would clearly be governed by the Louisiana Act. Since Thomas had settled with
Amoco, this question was no longer before the court. The only question before the
court was whether Woodson's immunity from suits by Thomas or by third parties
like Amoco should also be governed by the Louisiana Act. The court answered this
question in the affirmative by applying Article 3515 as follows:
We believe that Louisiana is the only state which has an actual
interest in the workers' compensation aspect of this litigation; and as a
result, Louisiana's policies would be "most seriously impaired" if its laws
are not applied. The Louisiana Workers' Compensation Statute was
enacted to protect injured Louisiana employees as well as to prevent them
from becoming a financial burden on the state because of their disabilities.
Although Mr. Thomas was injured in Texas, he is domiciled in Louisiana
and presumably expected to return to Louisiana after completing his work
for Amoco. Thus, Louisiana, not Texas would bear the social costs of his
inability to work. In addition, as a Louisiana employer, Woodson had
"justified expectations" in making payments to Mr. Thomas according to
Louisiana's workers' compensation statutory scheme. Thus, we find that
Texas' interest in enforcing its workers' compensation laws would not be
"seriously impaired" by the application of Louisiana law. We hold,
therefore, that Louisiana law applies to the workers' compensation aspect
of this dispute. 45
Although the court's conclusion is correct, its analysis suffers from three flaws.
First, the court makes no mention of whether the Texas Workers Compensation Act
was any different from the Louisiana Act on the issue of whether Woodson would
be obligated to indemnify Amoco. Woodson had claimed that such indemnification
was precluded by the "exclusivity provisions" of both the Louisiana and the Texas
Acts. 4 6 If that was true, then there was no conflict on this issue and the court's
choice-of-law discussion was needlessly lengthy.
Second, assuming there was a conflict between the Louisiana and Texas Acts,
the issue before the court was not the obligation of Woodson to provide recovery
144. La. R.S. 23:1035.1 (1985). This statute provides, in part, as follows:
R.S. 23:1035.1. Extraterritorial coverage. (1) If an employee, while working outside
the territorial limits of this state, suffers an injury on account of which he, or in the event
of his death, his dependents, would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this
Chapter had such injury occurred within this state, such employee, or in the event of his
death resulting from such injury, his dependents, shall be entitled to the benefits provided
by this Chapter, provided that at the time of such injury (a) his employment is principally
localized in this state, or (b) he is working under a contract of hire made in this state.
145. Thomas, 815 F. Supp. at 186.
146. Id.
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for the injured employee, but rather Woodson's immunity under the Louisiana Act
from tort suits by Thomas or third parties such as Amoco. In that context, the
court's statement that "[t]he Louisiana Workers' Compensation Statute was enacted
to protect injured Louisiana employees as well as to prevent them from becoming
a financial burden on the state because of their disabilities,"14 7 and its observation
that "Mr. Thomas ... is domiciled in Louisiana and [is] presumably expected to
return to Louisiana," 48 are not particularly helpful. More relevant is the court's
statement that "as a Louisiana employer, Woodson had 'justified expectations' in
making payments to Mr. Thomas according to Louisiana's workers' compensation
statutory scheme. '"49 It would be more to the point if the court were to speak of
Woodson's expectations in not having to make payments to Amoco if such
payments are not required by "Louisiana's workers' compensation statutory
scheme." This was in fact the issue in Thomas.
Third, assuming that there was a conflict with regard to this issue between the
Louisiana and Texas Acts, then in resolving this conflict one should pay proper
attention to those provisions of the Louisiana Act that delineate its intended
extraterritorial reach. With regard to the employee's recovery, these provisions
expressly extend the Act's reach to Texas injuries if the employment is localized
in Louisiana. The same should also be true with regard to the employer's
immunities. There is a close interrelationship between the Act's provisions
requiring the employer to provide compensation for the injured employee and the
provisions immunizing the employer from tort suits by the employee or third parties
like Amoco. The two sets of provisions are inseparable components of the
"fundamental equation in every workers' compensation system."'5 0 Assuming
that Texas law would require Woodson to provide tort indemnity to Amoco, then
the application of Texas law would significantly impair the interests of Louisiana
in establishing the proper equilibrium between the rights of employers and
employees and in enabling employers like Woodson to properly calculate and
insure against the costs of industrial accidents.' 5'
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Eger v. E.I. Du Pont DeNemours Co., 539 A.2d 1213 (N.J. 1988). According to the court
in Eger:
Immunity from tort liability of a party obligated to provide compensation coverage is an
essential element of the fundamental equation in every workers' compensation system:
the statutorily imposed agreement in which an employer provides compensation coverage
protecting employees injured in all work-related accidents without regard to fault in return
for immunity from suit based on fault arising from such accidents. . . . "The courts
clearly consider that this system of mutual give and take would be upset if the employee
could sue for negligence in another jurisdiction."
Id. at 1217 (quoting Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868, 873-74 (D.C. Cir.) (footnote
omitted), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824, 75 S. Ct. 39 (1954)) (citations omitted).
151. See Eger, 539 A.2d 1213, a case very similar to Thomas but involving the reverse fact
pattern. In Eger, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
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This of course only answers the question of whether Louisiana's interests
would be impaired by the application of Texas law. It does not answer the question
of whether Louisiana's interests would be more impaired by the application of
Texas law than Texas interests would be by the application of Louisiana law. To
answer that question, one should examine the relevant Texas law and its underlying
policy. If, as it is likely, Texas' law was no different from Louisiana's, then neither
state's interests would be impaired by the application of the other state's law. If
Texas law was different than Louisiana's, then a true conflict might result that
should be resolved through the approach of Article 3515, with proper attention
being paid to the extraterritorial policies of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1035.1.
4. Liberative Prescription Conflicts
Two Louisiana appellate court cases and one diversity case decided during the
survey period involve Article 3549 of the new law on liberative prescription
5 2
and provide good illustrations of its operation in practice.' Before discussing
Application of New Jersey law to allow a tort suit against a South Carolina general
contractor such as Du Pont would undermine the foundation of that state's workers'
compensation statute....
... [T]he obligation to provide workers' compensation coverage and immunity from tort
liability are linked in any integrated and comprehensive workers' compensation
scheme .... [S]ubjecting a South Carolina general contractor to tort liability in addition
to the expense of providing compensation coverage for all employment-related accidents
would frustrate that state's interest in regulating the manner in which victims of industrial
accidents are compensated.
Id. at 1217-18. See also Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 282-83 (N.Y. App.
1993):
Missouri's decision to shield employers from contribution claims is thus a policy choice
implicating significant State interests: "to deny a person the immunity granted * * * by
a work[erl's compensation statute of a given state would frustrate the efforts of that state
to restrict the cost of industrial accidents and to afford a fair basis for predicting what
these costs will be." (Restatement [Second] of Conflicts of Laws § 184, cmt. b, at 547.)
Indeed, as the Restatement concluded in a related context, for another State "to subject
a person who has been held liable in work[er]'s compensation to further unlimited liability
in tort or wrongful death would frustrate the work[erl's compensation policy of the State
in which the award was rendered." (Restatement [Second] of Conflicts of Laws § 183,
cmt. c, at 544.)
152. For a brief discussion of Article 3549, see Symeonides, The Louisiana Experience, supra
note 32, at 502-07. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, Revising Puerto Rico's Conflicts Law: A
Preview, 28 Colum. J. Transn'l L. 413, 433-447 (1990), discussing a similar, but not identical, article
drafted by this author for the Puerto Rican Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence and contained
in the Projet for the Codification of Puerto Rican Private International Law (Academy Draft #1,
March 1, 1991). The discussion in the text draws from these writings.
153. See Smith v. Odeco (UK), Inc., 615 So.2d 407 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993); Rafferty v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 613 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993); Louisiana Land and
Exploration Co. v. Enserch Corp., Civ. A. No. 92-02057, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15710 (E.D. La.
Sept. 28, 1992), discussed at text accompanying infra notes 219-221. For other cases involving
prescription conflicts that were rendered after January 1, 1992, but decided under the old law, see
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them, however, it might be helpful to explain the philosophy of the new law on this
issue and to compare it with the old law. 114
a. The Old Law
Until the enactment of the new law, Louisiana's choice-of-law rules on
prescription conflicts were found in paragraphs six and seven of former Article 15
of the Civil Code. Paragraph six contained the general rule requiring the application
of the law of the forum (hereinafter lexfori) to all prescription conflicts. Paragraph
six provided:
The prescription provided by the laws of this state applies to an
obligation arising under the laws of another jurisdiction which is sought
to be enforced in this state. 155
This paragraph embodied the traditional common-law approach which, based on
the premise that prescription is a matter of procedure, assigned all prescription
questions to the exclusive domain of the law of the forum.'56 This is in high
contrast to the civil-law approach which considers -liberative prescription merely
as a mode of extinction of an obligation and thus a substantive matter which is
Trizec Properties, Inc. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 974 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1992); Washington v.
Allstate Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 91-3779, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9961 (E.D. La. June 30, 1992); In re
Public Investors, Inc. v. Finevest Life Investors, Civ. A. No. 92-1106, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7146
(E.D. La. May 19, 1992); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ward, 612 So.2d 964 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1993).
154. For a discussion of the pre-1992 law, see Dana P. Karam, Note, Conflict of
Laws-Liberative Prescription, 47 La. L. Rev. 1153 (1987); Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana and
Comparative Conflicts Law 376-77 (4th ed. 1993).
155. This paragraph was formerly the first paragraph of Article 3532 of the Civil Code and was
placed there in 1960. It was drawn from a similar provision contained in Article 13 of the 1870
Code of Practice (repealed in 1960) which provided that "[tlhe forms, the effects and the prescription
of actions are governed by the law of the place where they are brought .... " 1983 La. Acts No.
173 authorized the redesignation of the two paragraphs of La. Civ. Code art. 3532 (the second
paragraph being the "borrowing statute" discussed below) as paragraphs six and seven of Article 10
of the Civil Code, and provided that this redesignation was not meant to be "an amendment to or a
reenactment of" Article 3532. In 1987, Article 10 of the Civil Code was redesignated as Article 15
by 1987 La. Acts No. 124, which, again, provided that this redesignation was "neither an amendment
to or a re-enactment" of Article 10.
156. For recent discussions of past and present American practice, see Robert A. Leflar et al.,
American Conflicts Law 348-56 (4th ed. 1986); Scoles & Hay, supra note 32, at 58-67; Russell J.
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 56-66 (3d ed. 1986); Margaret R. Grossman,
Statutes of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1980); P.
John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1989: An
Overview, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 601, 630-36 (1990); Gary L. Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts
Between Statutes of Limitations, 27 Hastings L.J. 1 (1975); Karam, supra note 154; Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1988, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 457, 474-78
(1989); Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debate, 1991 U. I11. L. Rev. 683 (1991).
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governed by the same law as the one that governs the obligation." 7 In the United
States, the traditional approach gradually began to give way as soon as it was
realized that, in such a mobile society, the inexorable application of the prescription
law of the forum rewards shopping for the forum with the lengthiest prescriptive
period. To curtail such forum shopping, state legislatures in the rest of the country
enacted "borrowing statutes," that authorized the borrowing by the forum court of
the prescription law of another state. '5 The state whose law is borrowed is
typically the "state where the cause of action arose"'5 9 and is normally the state
157. The civil-law approach is exemplified in this hemisphere by the following: (1) Article 229
of the Bustamiante Code, which provides that "[e]xtinctive prescription of personal actions is
governed by the law to which the obligations which is to be extinguished is subject." Code of
Private International Law (Bustamante Code), Annexed to Convention on Private International Law,
signed at Havana on February 20, 1928, in Convencion de Derecho Internacional Privado (1928); (2)
Article 2099 of the Peruvian Civil Code, which provides that "the limitation of personal actions as
a result of inaction for a period of time (perscription extinctiva) is governed by the law of the
underlying obligation." 129 Normas Legales 128-33 (Oct. 1984) in Alejandro M. Garro, Peru:
Private International Law in the New Civil Code of 1984, 24 I.L.M. 997, 1011 (1985) (Although the
article has been amended recently, it is virtually identical to the above.).
On the European continent, see Paragraph 10 of Article 10 of the Spanish Civil Code as amended
in 1974, which provides that "[a] law that governs the obligation also governs matters relating to
performance and to the consequences of non-performance as well as to extinction." Extract of
Preliminary Title of the Spanish Civil Code as amended July 9, 1974, 21 Netherlands L. Rev. 367,
374 (1974).
For other examples of the civilian approach, see (1) Article 148 of the Swiss Federal Statute on
Private International Law of December 18, 1987, which provides: "1. The law applicable to a claim
governs its prescription and extinction. 2. In case of extinction by set-off, the applicable law is the
law that governs the claim against which the set-off is asserted." Swiss Federal Statute on Private
International Law of December 18, 1987 231 (Cornu Hankins & Symeon C. Symeonides trans. LSU
Publication 1989); (2) Article 32 of the 1986 Law Amending the Introductory Law to the German
Civil Code, which provides: "The law applicable to the contract by virtue of Articles 27 through 30
and Article 33 Paras. I and 2 shall govern in particular: .. .(d) the various ways of extinguishing
obligations, and prescription and limitation of actions." Gerhard Wegen, Federal Republic of
Germany Act on the Revision of the Private International Law (July 25, 1986), 27 I.L.M. 1, 21; (3)
Section 30(4) of the Hungarian Decree on Private Law of 1979, which provides: "To the statute of
limitations the law otherwise applicable to the claim shall apply." Hungarian Law Decree #13 of
1979 on Private International Law (Official Translation) 59.
For a comprehensive discussion of this subject, see Hage-Chahine, Les conflits dans l'espace et
le temps en matiere de prescription (1977); Dayant, Les problemes actuels de conflit de lois en
matiere de prescription, Travaus du Comite Francais Droit International Prive C30-32: 167-196
(1969-71).
158. This movement began in the middle of the 19th century and culminated in the 20th century
when a total of 38 states had enacted a borrowing statute in one form or another. The states that
have not enacted such a statute are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont.
The District of Columbia also did not enact any borrowing statute. In recent years Ohio and Texas
repealed their borrowing statute.
159. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-2-17 (1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-506 (1988); Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 361 (West 1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-118 (1989); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8121
(1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.10 (West 1988); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-9 (1989); Idaho Code § 5-238
(1988); Ind. Code § 34-1-2-6 (b) (1983); Iowa Code Ann. § 614.7 (West 1989); Kan. Civ. Proc. Code
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whose law would be applicable to the merits of the action (lexcausae). While they
vary in breadth and detail, these statutory exceptions to the lexfori rule share one
common characteristic: they apply only in cases in which the forum's prescriptive
period is longer, not shorter, than that of the state of the lex causae.'" Louisiana
enacted its own borrowing statute by Act 168 of 1855, which eventually found its
way into the civil code and became paragraph seven of former Article 15.161 That
paragraph provided:
When a contract or obligation has been entered into between persons
who reside out of this state, and such contract or obligation is barred by
prescription, or the statute of limitations, of the place where it is to be paid
or performed, it shall be considered and held to be barred by prescription
in this state, upon the debtor who is thus discharged coming into this
state. 162
This statute is one of the narrowest in the country.13  The terms "contract or
obligation," as used in the statute, suggest that the statute encompasses not only
causes of action based on contract, but also causes originating in other sources,
such as delicts or quasi-delicts. Nevertheless, closer analysis suggests that the
Ann. § 60-516 (Vernon 1988); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.320 (Baldwin 1979); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 260, § 9 (West 1980); Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-65 (Supp. 1989); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516-190
(Vernon Supp. 1990); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11-020 (1989): N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 202 (McKinney
1972); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-21 (1988); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305-20 (Baldwin 1988); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, §§ 104-108 (West 1988); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 12.410-480 (1988); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-18
(1985); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-112 (1980); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4-16-290 (1988).
160. For representative samples of American borrowing statutes, see Symeonides, supra note
154, at 397-99. For a comprehensive study of borrowing statutes, see David H. Vernon, Statutes of
Limitations in the Conflict of Laws, 32 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 287 (1960) (For an update see David H.
Vernon, Conflict of Laws: Theory and Practice 3-14 to 3-16 (2d ed. 1982)). See also John W. Ester,
Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Fla. L. Rev. 33 (1962); Ibrahim J.
Wani, Borrowing Statutes, Statutes of Limitations and Modern Choice of Law, 57 UMKC L. Rev.
681 (1989).
161. 1855 La. Acts No. 168 was later designated, without any substantive change, as § 2808 of
the Louisiana Revised Statutes and then incorporated into the Civil Code of 1870 as Article 3532 of
that Code. In 1960, this article was amended by 1960 La. Acts No. 30. Act 30 took the language
of Article 13 of the repealed Code of Practice of 1870 and inserted it as a new paragraph into Article
3532. Since then, the two paragraphs of Article 3532 have met the same fate, eventually becoming
paragraphs six and seven of former Civil Code Article 15. See supra note 155.
162. La. Civ. Code art. 15, 7 (repealed 1991 La. Acts No. 923, effective Jan. 1, 1992).
163. Of the 38 borrowing statutes in the United States, the statutes of 36 states encompass all
"actions" or "causes of action," without regard to whether these actions arise out of contracts, torts,
etc. Only Virginia and West Virginia have narrower statutes. West Virginia's statute is confined to
actions "[ulpon a contract which was made and was to be performed in another state." W. Va. Code
§ 55-2-17 (1990). Virginia's borrowing statute provides: "No action shall be maintained on any
contract which is governed by the law of another state or country if the right of action thereon is
barred either by the laws of such state or country or of this Commonwealth." Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-
247 (Michie 1990). The similarity to Louisiana's borrowing statute found in paragraph seven of
former Article 15 of the Civil Code is obvious.
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original legislative intent was to encompass only contractual causes of action.
Although today no lawyer needs to be reminded that obligations may arise from
sources other than contracts,'(6 that was not necessarily true in 1855. It is more
likely that in the minds of the drafters of Act 168 of 1855 the term "obligation" was
meant to be either synonymous or parallel with the term "contractual obliga-
tion.' 165 This view is supported by the likely source of the Louisiana statute,
66
by its French text, 67 and because the words "contract or obligation" contained
therein are followed by the words "has been entered into." The italicized words
presuppose a volitional act-a contract, or a unilateral juridical act. One does not
"enter into" a delictual obligation. One incurs a delictual obligations as a result of
some "acts or facts.' 68 Had the drafters intended to include delictual obligations
within the scope of this provision, they would have used a different verb. Thus, it
seems rather clear that the original legislative intent was to confine this statute to
contractual causes of action. Whether this limitation should have been retained by
the Louisiana Legislature is a different question, especially in the latter half of this
century when forum shopping in tort cases became increasingly common. In any
event, Louisiana courts have abided by this limitation and have not attempted to
expand the statute to non-contractual causes. In fact, apparently because of the
extreme narrowness of this statute, Louisiana courts have never had the opportunity
to apply it squarely.'
69
164. See La. Civ. Code art. 1757 which provides that "obligations arise from contracts and other
declarations of will. They also arise directly from the law, regardless of a declarations of will, in
instances such as wrongful acts .... unjust enrichment and other acts or facts."
165. Evidence of this conclusion is found in Article 1750 of the Civil Code of 1825 (Article
1757 of the Code of 1870) which defined a civil obligation as "a legal tie, which gives the party with
whom it is contracted, the right of enforcing its performance by law." La. Civ. Code art. 1750 (1825)
(emphasis added). The italicized words show that, even the drafters of the 1825-1870 Code used the
broad term "obligation" as more or less synonymous with the narrower term "contractual obligation."
This erroneous understanding was probably more prevalent in the period around 1855, a period of
a rather serious decline of the civil-law tradition.
166. There is strong reason to suspect that the Louisiana statute was modelled after the Virginia
and West Virginia statutes, judging from the striking similarity in the language of these statutes and
the proximity in the dates of their enactment. The West Virginia statute was enacted in 1849 and
is now found in W. Va. Code § 55-2-17 (1990). The Virginia statute was enacted at about the same
time and, except for punctuation, was identical to the West Virginia statute. It is now found in Va.
Code Ann. § 8.01-247 (Michie 1990). Both statutes are confined to contract actions.
167. The French translation published on the opposite page from the English original in the
official publication of Act 168 of 1855 uses the words "sera contractce" for the English phrase
"entered into." Similarly, the words "to be paid or performed" are translated as "devra etre payd ou
exdcutM." The French text of a Louisiana statute of the period around 1855 is not authoritative,
however, since, unlike the Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825 which were drafted in French and then
translated into English, the ordinary statutes of the last three quarters of the 19th century were drafted
in English and then translated into French. Nevertheless, although the French text of Act 168 is not
authoritative, it reflects the understanding of that period that the "obligation" contemplated by the
drafters of 1855 La. Acts No. 168 was of the type that was contracted rather than incurred.
168. La. Civ. Code art. 1757.
169. The only case that came close to applying this statute to a cause of action-as opposed to
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Because paragraph 7, one of the narrowest exceptions in the nation, was the
only Louisiana exception to the lex fori rule, Louisiana law did not develop
smoothly in this very important area of conflicts law. Louisiana courts had their
hands tied, while common-law courts were free to develop other eiceptions to the
lexfori rule in their effort to curtail the forum shopping generated by the rule. Even
when the traditional conflicts theory dominated the United States, American courts
developed an exception that authorizes the court to apply a foreign prescriptive
period that is shorter than the forum's, if the foreign period is conceived or
perceived as a limitation to the right itself, not just the remedy."o For example,
common-law courts typically invoke this exception to dismiss a wrongful death
action arising under the law of another state, if the other state's law subjects the
action to a shorter limitation period. Noting that a wrongful death action was not
recognized by the common law, these courts reason that the action was granted by
statute supposedly on the condition that it be exercised within the short limitation
period. Although this exception was mentioned in dicta by Louisiana courts,'
a foreign judgment-was Drs. Young & Geraghty v. Bowie, 3 La. App. 8 (Orl. 1925). Bowie
involved an action for the recovery of fees for medical services rendered in Maryland by two doctors
domiciled there to a patient who was then domiciled in Texas and who moved to Louisiana after the
lapse of Texas' two-year statute of limitations. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the action which was filed within Louisiana's thee-year prescriptive period but did not
discuss nor rely expressly on this statute, then La. Civ. Code art. 3532. The court relied upon
Newman v. Eldridge, 107 La. 315, 31 So. 688 (1902), a case that applied La. R.S. 2808 (1870) (the
predecessor of paragraph seven) to a foreign judgment. Walworth v. Routh, 14 La. Ann. 205 (1859),
like Newman, involved a foreign judgment rather than a foreign cause of action. In determining
whether La. R.S. 2808 (1870) was applicable to a foreign judgment, the court in Roper v. Monroe
Grocer Co., 171 La. 181, 129 So. 811 (1930) stated in dictum that the word "between" in the clause
"whenever any contract or obligation has been entered into or judgement rendered between persons
who reside out of the State" was used "with reference to contracts, more than with reference to
judgments." Id. at 813 (emphasis added). In Kirby Lumber Co. v. Hicks Co., 144 La. 473, 80 So.
663 (1919), which involved a contractual cause of action, the court held correctly that the borrowing
statute was inapplicable because, although the contract involved Texas land and was perhaps to be
performed in that state, the contracting parties were both domiciled in Louisiana and had contracted
there. Finally, in Trizec Properties, Inc., v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 974 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1992),
the statute was found to be inapplicable to a non-contractual cause of action.
170. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140 (1886); Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co..
220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955). For the latest examples of cases applying the shorter built-in limitation
period of a foreign wrongful death statute, see Siroonian v. Textron, Inc., 844 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1988); Shell Oil Co. v. Hickman, 716 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Va. 1989).
171. The first case in Louisiana to mention this exception was a diversity case, Kozan v.
Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959), in which the Fifth Circuit said that "[ilf a foreign statute
of limitations not only bars the remedy but extinguishes the substantive right as well, then the forum
will apply the limitation period of the foreign jurisdiction." Id. at 841. However, this statement was
pure dictum. Moreover, the authority cited for it, a law review article, Mary B. Perkins, Comment,
Limitation of Actions in the Conflict of Laws, 10 La. L. Rev. 374, 377 (1950), is suspect. The article
claimed that one Louisiana case, Harrison v. Stacy, 6 Rob. 15 (La. 1843), had applied this exception;
however, although the court in Harrison applied a Mississippi prescriptive period that might qualify
as preemptive or "substantive," the basis for doing so is not at all clear. Harrison did not mention
the pertinent Louisiana prescription and ignored completely Article 13 of the 1825 Code of Practice,
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the better view is that it was not recognized in Louisiana because neither paragraph
six nor paragraph seven of Civil Code article 15 would seem to permit it.
Responding to criticisms by commentators,'72 American courts begun to
gradually break away from the traditional lex fori rule and began subjecting
prescription issues to the same choice-of-law analysis as the other issues before the
court without any a priori reliance on the lexfori.' This new trend is reflected
in the 1987 and 1988 revisions of § 142 of the Second Conflicts Restatement. 74
Subsection (1) of new § 142, especially through its cross-reference to § 6,
establishes a nuanced, flexible formula for determining the law applicable to
prescription. This formula purports to be detached from any a priori preference for
either the lexfori or the lex causae. However, perhaps because this formula may
be time-consuming (or it may mean different things to different people), this
formula is implemented through presumptive rules that are based on the lexfori as
the basic rule.
In 1982, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a new
uniform act,' which, somewhat surprisingly, moved to the other extreme by
adopting the premise that prescription is a substantive matter which should
therefore be governed by the law of the state whose law would govern the merits
which provided that "prescription of actions ... [is] governed by the law of the place where it is
brought." The Kozan dictum was repeated in Rohde v. Southeastern Drilling Co., Inc., 667 F.2d
1215 (5th Cir. 1982), but again as dictum. Kleckley v. Hebert, 464 So.2d 39 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1985), should be seen as a case of federal preemption rather than choice of law. Recently, Judge
Sear rejected the applicability of this exception in Trizec Properties, Inc. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co.,
Civ. A. No. 89-4133, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5241 at *4 n.4 (E.D. La. Apr, 11, 1991).
172. In addition to the writings cited at supra note 156, see James A. Martin, Statutes of
Limitations and Rationality in the Conflict of Laws, 19 Washburn L.J. 405 (1980); Note, An Interest-
Analysis Approach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitation, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299 (1974). For an
early criticism, see, The Statutes of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J. 492 (1919).
For an excellent recent discussion, see Weinberg, supra note 156.
173. This trend is represented by Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d. 412 (N.J. 1973). See also
Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983); Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d
1065 (9th Cir. 1981); Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978); Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v.
Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414 (Wisc. 1973).
174. Section 142 of the Restatement (Second) provides in part:
In general, unless the exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result
unreasonable: (1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim;
(2) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the claim unless (a)
maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the forum; and (b) the
claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state having a more significant
relationship to the parties and the occurrence.
For critical discussion, see Weinberg, supra note 156, at 705-710.
175. See Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act, 12 U.L.A. 56 (1988). This Act has been
adopted by Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington. For an
authoritative discussion, see Robert A. Leflar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 Mercer L. Rev.
461 (1984). Professor Leflar was the chairman of the Drafting Committee, with the late Professor
James A. Martin of Michigan serving as the Reporter. See also Laura Cooper, Statutes of Limitation
in Minesota Choice of Law: The Problematic Return of the Substance-Procedure Distinction, 71
Minn. L. Rev. 363 (1986); Weinberg, supra note 156, at 702-705.
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of the action (lex causae) 7 6 However, recognizing that often the forum has
important interests in matters of prescription, this Act makes some concessions in
favor of the law of the forum (lexfori). Section 4 of the Act authorizes resort to the
lexfori if the limitation period of the lex causae "is substantially different from the
limitation period of this state and has not afforded a fair opportunity to sue upon,
or imposes an unfair burden in defending against the claim." This Act is a
significant improvement over its predecessor which had called for the application
of whichever of the two laws (i.e., the lexfori or the lex causae) provided for the
shorter prescriptive period.'77 Although not directly influenced by the civil law,
the new Act accidentally reflects the civilian approach which considers prescription
as merely a mode of extinguishing the obligation and subjects it to the same law as
the one applicable to the merits of the obligation or action (lex causae),7 8
b. Lessons Derived From Experience and Comparison
It seems that both the civil-law approach and the traditional common-law
approach suffer from a holistic characterization of prescription as being always a
substantive or always a procedural matter. In fact, a rule of prescription may, and
usually does, serve both substantive and procedural objectives or policies.' 79 For
176. Section 2 of the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act provides:
(a) Except as provided by Section 4, if a claim is substantively based: (1) upon the law
of one other state, the limitation period of that state applies; or (2) upon the law of more
than one state, the limitation period of one of those states chosen by the law of conflict
of laws of this State, applies.
(b) The limitation period of this State applies to all other claims.
177. See Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 507, 508 (1980).
This Act was promulgated in 1957 and was officially withdrawn in 1978 after being adopted in only
three states (Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia).
178. See supra note 157.
179. For an authoritative and eloquent articulation of this basic truth, see Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2129 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring):
Were statutes of limitations purely substantive, the issue would be an easy one, for
where, as here, a forum State has no contacts with the underlying dispute, it has no
substantive interests and cannot apply its own law on a purely substantive matter. Nor
would the issue be difficult if statutes of limitations were purely procedural, for the
contacts a State has with a dispute by virtue of being the forum always create state
procedural interests that make application of the forum's law on procedural questions
"neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Statutes of limitation, however, defy
characterization as either purely procedural or purely substantive. The statute of
limitations a State enacts represents a balance between, on the one hand, its substantive
interest in vindicating claims and, on the other hand, a combination of its procedural
interest in freeing its courts from adjudicating stale claims and its substantive interest in
giving individuals repose from ancient breaches of law. A State that has enacted a
particular limitations period has simply determined that after that period the interest in
vindicating claims becomes outweighed by the combination of the interests in repose and
avoiding stale claims. One cannot neatly categorize this complicated temporal balance as
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instance, a rule that subjects medical malpractice claims to a short prescription is
designed to accomplish certain substantive objectives by shielding a particular class
of defendants (doctors and their insurers and through them the consumers at large)
from prolonged exposure to liability. At the same time, this rule promotes certain
procedural objectives by reducing the number of malpractice actions and thus helps
to conserve judicial energy. Similarly, a rule that prohibits renunciation of
prescription promotes substantive aims by protecting the debtor from the coercive
power of the creditor. At the same time, by preventing the lengthening of
prescription beyond the point considered appropriate by the law of the forum, this
rule serves procedural policies by protecting the courts from the burden of, and
dangers inherent in, adjudicating old claims. On the other hand, a rule that
prohibits the contractual shortening of prescription of actions by an insured against
his insurer subordinates the procedural policies of encouraging the early filing of
actions to the preferred substantive policy of protecting the insured from the
superior bargaining power of the insurer.
Thus, from the choice-of-law perspective, the automatic application of the law
of the forum to all multistate cases (the traditional common-law approach) would
seem to be as arbitrary as the automatic application of the lex causae (the traditional
civil-law approach). By exaggerating the procedural function of prescription and
ignoring its substantive function, the traditional common-law approach encourages
forum shopping and a disregard for the legitimate interests of other states that might
be more intimately related to the parties and their dispute. By overemphasizing the
substantive function of prescription, the traditional civilian approach prevents the
forum from promoting its own procedural interests qua forum.
Therefore it is not surprising that, despite their original differences, both of
these approaches have gradually come to recognize the need for some concessions
in favor of the other and have abandoned their exclusive adherence to a single law.
This need for exceptions is perhaps the most important lesson from this experience.
In a sense, it is less important which of the two laws (i.e., lexfori or lex causae) is
eventually adopted as the basic rule, as long as it is subjected to appropriate
exceptions. The difficult question is therefore not whether exceptions should exist,
but which exceptions should be carved out of the basic rule. While reasonable
people might disagree on where exactly to draw the lines of the compromise, this
experience can at least help identify some of the forces that are usually at work in
prescription conflicts. Without a claim to completeness, these forces may be placed
in four categories: (a) the procedural and substantive policies embodied in the
particular prescription rule of the forum; (b) the substantive policies embodied in
the prescription rule of the state whose law governs the merits of the action; (c) the
universal policy of discouraging forum shopping; and (d) the federally sanctioned
policy of providing a forum for multistate causes of action in appropriate
circumstances. Obviously, these forces do not appear with the same intensity in all
either procedural or substantive.
[Vol. 54
LOUISIANA CONFLICTS LAW
prescription conflicts and usually point in opposite directions. However, they do
exist, cannot be ignored, and are not susceptible to simplistic recipes.
c. The New Law'
80
i. The New Basic Rule
Drawing from the above lessons, Article 3549 of the new law attempts to
combine the strengths and avoid the problems of the common-law approach and the
civil-law approach. Consistent with, but not because of Louisiana's mixed legal
heritage, Article 3549 is built around the lex causae and the lexfori, the two poles
of the civilian and the common-law approaches respectively-perhaps with a slight
tilt in favor of the latter. The article attempts to attain a balance between the four
competing forces identified above and to find the golden mean between tradition
and progress, between predictability and flexibility. The first paragraph of Article
354981 provides that forum prescription law applies without exception, and
without consideration of whether or not it bars the action, to all actions whose
merits are governed by forum substantive law. The first sentence of the second
paragraph also provides that the lexfori applies in principle even to actions the
merits of which are governed by the substantive law of another state. However, this
general statement is qualified by two exceptions articulated in the subparagraphs
(1) and (2) of that paragraph. 2 By retaining the lexfori as the basic rule, Article
180. The discussion of the new law on this issue draws heavily from the Reporter's comments
to Article 3549, including the use of verbatim excerpts from these comments without quotation marks
or other citations. It is believed that, since the Reporter and this author are the same person, such
use is permissible.
181. La. Civ. Code art. 3549 provides:
Article 3549. Law Governing Liberative prescription. When the substantive law of this
state would be applicable to the merits of an action brought in this state, the prescription
and peremption law of this state applies.
When the substantive law of another state would be applicable to the merits of an action
brought in this state, the prescription and peremption law of this state applies, except as
specified below:
(1) If the action is barred under the law of this state, the action shall be dismissed
unless it would not be barred in the state whose law would be applicable to the merits of
the action and maintenance of the action in this state is warranted by compelling
considerations of remedial justice.
(2) If the action is not barred under the law of this state, the action shall be maintained
unless it would be barred in the state whose law is applicable to the merits and
maintenance of the action in this state is not warranted by the policies of this state and
its relationship to the parties or the dispute nor by any compelling considerations of
remedial justice.
This article applies to issues of liberative prescription and peremption, including all questions of
commencement, suspension, interruption, and accrual. This article does not apply to prescription of
judgments, to acquisitive prescription, or to prescription of non-use of real rights other than
ownership.
182. These two exceptions are deliberately phrased differently so that the burden of displacing
1994]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
3549 maintains an important link with prior Louisiana law and serves the goals of
simplicity and predictability. At the same time, by carving out of that rule two
broad and flexible exceptions, the second paragraph of the article will hopefully
achieve the right amount of flexibility.
ii. The First Exception: Actions Barred by the Lex Fori But Not
by the Lex Causae
The first exception is established by subparagraph (1) of the second paragraph
of Article 3549, which begins by reaffirming the lexfori rule for actions barred
under the law of the forum,"8 3 and then states the two prerequisites for the
exception.'" The first is that the action "would not be barred in the state whose
law would be applicable to the merits of the action." The second is that "mainte-
nance of the action in this state is warranted by compelling considerations of
remedial justice." This language is borrowed from the 1986 revision of § 142 of
the Restatement Second. The examples given by the Restatement are pertinent to
the application of this provision and illustrate its exceptional character. These
examples refer to cases where "through no fault of the plaintiff an alternative forum
is not available as, for example, where jurisdiction could not be obtained over the
defendant in any state other than the forum or where for some reason a judgment
obtained in the other state having jurisdiction would be unenforceable 'in other
states.... also ... situations where suit in the alternative forum, although not
impossible would be extremely inconvenient for the parties."' 85 As might be
surmised from the initial phrase of the quotation, none of these examples should be
seen as requiring the forum to entertain an action solely because it is time-barred
in all or most other states. The disapproving reference to Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.186 as an "egregious example of forum-shopping" in the comments
to this section of the Restatement leaves little doubt that the plaintiff's own
forum law will be heavier in cases where forum law provides for a longer prescriptive period
(subparagraph 2) than in cases in which it provides for a shorter prescriptive period (subparagraph
1) than the foreign lex causae.
183. The rationale for the rule in these cases is that the application of the shorter prescriptive
period of the lexfori promotes the forum's interest in judicial economy and protects the integrity of
its judicial system.
184. This exception departs from prior Louisiana law which did not allow the displacement of
the lexfori when it provided for a shorter prescriptive period than that of the lex causae. See supra
text accompanying notes 163-172. The reason for this was apparently the desire to protect the
judicial system of the forum from the burden of, and the dangers inherent in, adjudicating claims that
were deemed too old under the forum's principles of liberative prescription. However, in some cases
this otherwise legitimate desire should yield to an equally important need to provide a forum. By
authorizing a new exception to the lexfori rule, subparagraph (1) recognizes this need.
185. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 1986 Revisions, § 142 cmt. f (Supp. March 3 1,
1987).
186. 465 U.S. 770, 465 S. Ct. 770 (1984). In Keeton, the plaintiff was able to take advantage
of New Hampshire's unusually long six-year statute of limitation and to file her defamation action
in that state after it had already prescribed in virtually all other states of the United States.
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procrastination is not likely to make his case compelling enough to reach the
threshold of this exception.
The first Louisiana appellate case involving this exception was Smith v. Odeco
(UK), Inc. 87 Smith involved an action by a resident and citizen of the United
Kingdom for injuries suffered aboard a U.S. flag vessel (drilling rig) owned by
Odeco, while the vessel was engaged in exploration and development of offshore
energy resources in waters overlaying the Continental Shelf off the coast of Spain.
The defendant companies were incorporated under Delaware law and had their
corporate offices in New Orleans, Louisiana. The parties conceded and the court
agreed that the law applicable to the merits of this action would be the law of the
United Kingdom, apparently because the plaintiff was domiciled and hired in that
country and took his work orders out of Odeco (UK)'s office in Aberdeen,
Scotland. This conclusion renders inapplicable the first paragraph of Article 3549
and makes applicable its second paragraph. The Louisiana action was filed after
the accrual of Louisiana's one-year prescription for torts, but before the accrual of
the three-year limitation provided by British law. Thus, since the action was barred
by the prescription law of the lexfori but not by that of the lex causae, the case falls
within the scope of subparagraph 1 of the second paragraph of Article 3549.
The court held that the exception described above was applicable and
allowed the action to proceed because "'compelling considerations of remedial
justice' exist which warrant maintenance of this suit in Louisiana."' 88  In
support of its holding, the court quoted an example from the Reporter's
comments to Article 3549 explaining the application of this exception. The
example refers to cases where "through no fault of the plaintiff an alternative
forum is not available as, for example, when jurisdiction could not be obtained
over the defendant in any state other than the forum . 1.8..9 The court
explained that the plaintiff was blameless in that he filed the appropriate action
in Scotland well within the British prescriptive period of three years, and perhaps
within the Louisiana prescriptive period of one year'90 The court also
explained that under Scottish law, the Scottish courts did not have jurisdiction
over any of the defendant companies because none of them was either domiciled
in or had its "management and control" in any part of the United Kingdom.' 9'
187. 615 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
188. Id. at 410.
189. Reporter's cmt. (f) to La. Civ. Code art. 3549, quoted in Smith, 615 So. 2d at 409.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 196-197.
191. Smith, 615 So. 2d at 409-410. The court also noted:
when plaintiff filed suit in Aberdeen, Scotland, Odeco (UK), Inc. could not be located at
its registered address. An additional attempt to serve the corporation resulted in the
discovery that Odeco (UK), Inc. no longer did business there and that the premises were
now occupied by a company named Diamond M-Odeco Inc. which existed in the United
Kingdom in name only, and no management and control of the company was exercised
there. The affiant further states that the Scottish Courts could thus decline jurisdiction.
The affiant further avers that he is "not aware of any reasonable grounds on which it
would be open to Mr. Smith to sue any co-defender in Scotland in respect to this
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Instead, all the defendants had their corporate offices in New Orleans, Louisi-
ana. 92 The court concluded that "Louisiana is the only forum where a suit
may be maintained against all the defendants, with their principal offices [in
Louisiana]"' 93 and that "[i]n the absence of an alternative forum in which there
is jurisdiction over all defendants, 'compelling considerations of remedial justice'
exist which warrant maintenance of this suit in Louisiana."'
94
Both the result and the reasoning in Smith are entirely in accord with the
spirit of the new law. However, one technical point raised by Smith deserves
further discussion. The court states that the plaintiff's Scottish action was filed
on September 22, 1989;' however, the court also states that this was also the
date of the accident. t96 Since it is rather uncommon for lawsuits to be filed on
the very date of the accident, especially offshore accidents, it is likely that there
is a typographical error in the dates given by the court. The date of the filing
of the Scottish action would have been relevant if the Scottish court was a court
of "competent jurisdiction and venue."' In such a case, under Civil Code
article 3462, as interpreted in Taylor v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,9 8 the filing
in the Scottish court would interrupt the running of the Louisiana prescrip-
tion. t99 Interruption would occur at least if the Scottish action was filed within
Louisiana's prescriptive period.2" In turn, this would mean that the action
would not be barred by either the lexfori or the lex causa, and hence, the case
would fall under neither of the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of
new Article 3549. Instead, the case would fall within the opening sentence of
the second paragraph which calls for the application of the prescription law of
the forum. However, since the Smith court held that the Scottish courts did not
have jurisdiction, then under Civil Code article 3462, the filing in Scotland could
not interrupt the Louisiana prescription even if the filing was within the
Louisiana prescriptive period of one year from the accident.2 '
accident."
Id. at 409.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 410.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 409.
196. Id. at 408.
197. La. Civ. Code art. 3462.
198. 579 So. 2d 443 (La. 1991).
199. "Prescription is interrupted when an obligee commences an action against his obligor that
is timely in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue under the law of the forum, regardless of
whether the forum is a Louisiana court. La. Civ. Code art. 3462." Id. at 445 (reaffirming previous
jurisprudence cited therein).
200. Some loose language in Taylor suggests that the same effect would be produced if the filing
was after the accrual of the Louisiana period but within the foreign court's prescriptive period. See
infra note 207 and accompanying text.
201. However, under La. Civ. Code art. 3462, "[i]f action is commenced in an incompetent court
... prescription is interrupted only as to a defendant served by process within the prescriptive
period." (emphasis added). It appears that at least one defendant, Odeco (UK), was served with
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Thus considered, the only way for the plaintiff to pursue his action in
Louisiana would be through the escape clause of subparagraph 1. In applying
that subparagraph, one very relevant consideration in determining whether there
exist "compelling considerations of remedial justice" for maintaining the
plaintiffs action in Louisiana is the plaintiffs own blameworthiness. In
assessing that factor, the court should accord proper weight to the fact that the
plaintiff did file an action in Scotland and that the action was filed not only
within the Scottish prescriptive period but, in all likelihood, also within
Louisiana's prescriptive period. The Smith court did precisely that and should
be applauded. °2
Smith may be usefully contrasted with a similar case that was decided the
opposite way under the old law. Kozan v. Comstock203 involved a medical
malpractice action arising out of a medical procedure that occurred in Indiana at
a time when both the doctor and the patient were domiciled in that state. Fifteen
months later, the plaintiff sued the doctor in Indiana within that state's two-year
limitation period. That action remained pending for many years while the
defendant left the state. He was eventually located by the plaintiff in Louisiana
where he was sued on the same cause of action. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff's Louisiana action was barred by Louisiana's
prescription of one year. The court reasoned that the Louisiana prescription was
not interrupted by the plaintiff's Indiana action because, although the action was
filed within Indiana's prescriptive period, it was filed after the accrual of the
Louisiana prescription. This holding might have been technically correct under
Louisiana's conflicts law as it then existed; as explained earlier, the old law
required the inexorable application of the law of the forum to cases such as
Kozan.2°4 However, the holding was also unduly harsh for the plaintiff who
had done everything a prudent plaintiff could do under the circumstances. He
filed his first action, and did so timely, in the state that had the exclusive claim
to apply its substantive and prescriptive law. Although that action might have
been untimely under Louisiana law, the plaintiff had no reason to anticipate its
application. It is only because the defendant left Indiana and established a
domicile in Louisiana that the plaintiff had to file a second action in this state.
This case is quite similar to Smith and thus could also be a good candidate for
the exception provided in subparagraph 1 of the second paragraph of Article
3549.20'
process. See Smith, 615 So. 2d at 409 ("Odeco (UK) Inc., answered the [Scottish] suit."). Thus,
prescription might have been interrupted as to Odeco (UK) and, under Civil Code articles 1799 and
3503, as to all other defendants solidarily liable to the plaintiff with Odeco (UK). See Taylor, 579
So. 2d 443.
202. Smith, 615 So. 2d at 409.
203. 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
204. At the time Article 13 of the Louisiana Code of Practice provided in part that "the
prescription of actions ... [is] governed by the law of the place where they are brought."
205. The only difference between Smith and Kozan is that the defendant doctor in Kozan would
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It could be argued that this part of Kozan, which held that the timeliness of
the Indiana action should be judged by Louisiana's rather than Indiana's
standards, might have been repudiated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Taylor
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.2°6 Taylor contains statements to the effect that the
"timeliness" of a suit filed in a foreign state is to be judged by the standards of
that state rather than by those of Louisiana.0 7 However, these statements
should be read in context. In Taylor, a Louisiana resident injured in July 1985
in an Arkansas accident caused by a Texas driver sued the tortfeasor in Arkansas
in May 1987, within two years from the accident. In April 1988, while the
Arkansas suit was pending, plaintiff filed suit in Louisiana against his own UM
carrier.0 8 The court held that the timeliness of the Arkansas tort suit against
the tortfeasor should be judged by Arkansas law which provides for a three year
limitation, rather than by Louisiana's one-year prescription. Since that suit was
timely filed, then under Civil Code articles 3462, 1799 and 3503, it interrupted
prescription of the obligation of the UM carrier who was solidarily bound to
plaintiff with the tortfeasor. Thus, the plaintiff's action against his UM insurer,
which is subject to the two-year prescriptive period of Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:5629 did not prescribe. However, despite dicta that might suggest otherwise,
the court did not hold that the Arkansas filing, which occurred more than a year
after the accident, interrupted the accrued Louisiana prescription of one year
against the tortfeasor. The court was simply preoccupied with the interruption
of the two-year Louisiana prescription against the plaintiff's UM carrier. In that
context, it is important to note, although the Taylor court did not, that the
Arkansas action was filed within two years from the accident. Hence, under Civil
Code articles 3462, 1799, and 3503, it was capable of interrupting the two-year
prescription of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5629.20 9  Thus, reduced to its
essentials, Taylor stands for the proposition that a foreign suit filed against a
person solidarily liable with the defendant interrupts prescription against the
in all likelihood be subject to the jurisdiction of Indiana courts under that state's long-arm statute.
206. 579 So. 2d 443 (La. 1991).
207. "[Gleneral conflicts of laws provisions would require that the tort statute of limitations of
Arkansas be applied to determine the timeliness of a suit ... filed in that forum and arising out of
an accident occurring in that state." Id. at 446. After discussing the various modern choice-of-law
methodologies, the court concluded that under any of these methodologies "Arkansas law on the
limitation of actions applies and requires the determination that the Arkansas tort suit was timely."
Id. at 447.
208. The Arkansas suit was later settled and voluntarily dismissed in July 1988. Since it
occurred after the filing of the Louisiana action, the dismissal did not retroactively "erase" the
interruption caused by the Louisiana action. See Levy v. Stelly, 277 So.2d 194 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973), sanctioned by La. Civ. Code art. 3463, cmt. f.
209. On the other hand, if the Arkansas action was filed after the accrual of the two-year
prescription provided by La. R.S. 9:5629, but within the three-year Arkansas limitation, then, under
the law that was in force at the time, the insurer would have had a much stronger argument that the
action against it should be barred in Louisiana. Under the new law, this scenario could simply be
a candidate for the application of the exception contained in subparagraph I of the second paragraph
of Article 3549.
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Louisiana defendant when the foreign suit is timely under the prescription
provided by Louisiana law for actions against that defendant.
iii. The Second Exception: Actions Barred by the Lex Causae
But Not by the Lex Fori
The second exception to the lexfori rule is established by subparagraph 2
of the second paragraph of Article 3549. This subparagraph also begins by
reaffirming the basic rule of the lex fori for actions not barred under forum
prescription law,2"' and then spells out the three prerequisites for the exception
in favor of the lex causae. Again, all three prerequisites must be satisfied before
this exception is utilized. Before dismissing an action that has been timely filed
under forum law, the court must be satisfied that the action has prescribed in the
state of the lex causae, and that neither the substantive nor the procedural or
remedial policies of the forum state would be served by maintaining the action.
Only then would the policy of providing a forum be outweighed by the policy
of discouraging forum shopping.
The first necessary prerequisite for the application of the exception is that
the action would be barred by the statute of limitations or some other time-bar
recognized "in the state whose law is applicable to the merits [of the action]."
The second prerequisite is a showing that maintenance of the action in the forum
state "is not warranted by the policies of [the forum] state and its relationship to
the parties or the dispute." This test can be viewed either from a negative or
from a positive angle. The court must be satisfied that the policies of the forum
in providing a longer prescriptive period for actions of the type before the court
would not be adversely affected by dismissing the particular action, or that these
policies would be served by entertaining the action. Either way, this evaluation
will be based on an examination of the relationship, if any, that the forum has
with the parties or their dispute. The pertinent question will be whether that
relationship is of the kind that would implicate in a significant way the forum's
policies in providing a longer prescriptive period. 2 ' Finally, the third prerequi-
210. Here the rationale for the lexfori rule is that entertaining such actions promotes whatever
substantive policies the forum has in not providing for a shorter prescriptive period and preserves to
the plaintiff the opportunity to pursue fully his judicial remedies in the forum state. These
substantive and procedural policies underlying forum prescription law are entitled to preference in
a forum court, unless it is amply demonstrated that neither set of policies is'actually implicated in
the particular case and that the opposing substantive policies of another state, that of the lex causae,
are implicated more intimately. Only then may forum law be displaced.
211. By way of illustration, it would seem that if none of the parties is domiciled in the forum
state and neither they nor their dispute is related to it in any other significant way, the policies of this
state would not be served by imposing on its overburdened courts the adjudication of a dispute
which, but for the existence of jurisdiction, is essentially a foreign dispute. Dismissing the action
in such a case-which on its face appears to be a case of forum shopping-would not seriously affect
whatever interest the forum has in providing a longer prescriptive period, especially since, ex
hypothesi, this state is not the state of the lex causae.
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site is a showing that maintenance of the action in this state is not warranted by
"compelling considerations of remedial justice." This phrase is intended to have
the same meaning as in subparagraph 1. Again, under no circumstances should
this phrase be seen as a command or even as a license for entertaining a
particular action simply because it is barred in all or most other states. Such
egregious examples of forum shopping as Keeton v. Hustler are neither
encouraged nor condoned by Article 3549.
The first Louisiana appellate case involving this exception was Rafferty v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 2' a suit by a California insured against his
California UM insurer arising out of an accident in California. The plaintiff
continued living in California for about twenty-two months following the
accident, and then filed suit in Louisiana "alleging that he was a resident and
domiciliary of the Parish of Orleans."21  The tenor of the quoted phrase
suggests that the court seems to suspect that the plaintiff might have been forum
shopping. The court assumed correctly that the law applicable to the merits of
the action would have been California law. This assumption renders inapplicable
the first paragraph of Article 3549 and renders applicable the second paragraph
of the article. California's statute of limitation for such actions is one year,2"4
while Louisiana's applicable prescription is two years from the date of the
accident.2"' Since the plaintiff's action would be barred by California law (lex
causae), but not by Louisiana law (lexfori), the case falls within the scope of
subparagraph 2 of the second paragraph of Article 3549. The court dismissed the
action under the following rationale:
Maintenance of the action is not warranted by the policies of this state
and its relationship to the parties because this state's public policy
regarding the appropriate prescriptive period for a UM claim has no
application to a policy issued in California to a California resident.
There are no compelling considerations of remedial justice warranting
the maintenance of this action. Respondent had a year in which to
On the other hand, if the plaintiff is a Louisiana domiciliary, then dismissing his action would
deprive him of the opportunity to litigate in the most convenient forum, and would close to him the
doors of the judicial system which he helps sustain through his taxes. Depending on the other
circumstances of the particular case, dismissal here might not be warranted in light of the policies
of this state derived from its relationship to the plaintiff. Similarly, if the defendant is a Louisiana
domiciliary, there would seem to be less of a concern about forum shopping by the plaintiff and less
of an argument of unfair surprise by the defendant. These two factors would suggest that allowing
the action would be warranted by the policies of this state; however, whether this would actually be
so should be determined by the court by examining all the circumstances surrounding the particular
case.
212. 613 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
213. Id. at 728.
214. The insurance policy also provided that any suits by the insured against his insurer must
be brought within one year from the date of the accident. Such a clause was permissible under
California law.
215. La R.S. 9:5629 (1991).
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bring an action which would have been timely under his contract and
the law of the state where he was living, where the accident took place,
and where all parties involved in the accident resided. No injustice was
done to him by the application of the one year prescriptive period.
Consequently there are no compelling considerations of remedial justice
applicable to his situation.1 6
The court distinguished this case from Taylor v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,27 in
that the plaintiff in that case had filed an action in the state of the accident at a
time that was within the prescriptive period of that state. The court noted:
When respondent filed the present suit ... [t]he insurer had been
discharged of its obligation. Respondent could not resuscitate this
expired claim by moving to another state where the prescriptive period
was longer. An essential difference between Taylor and this case is that
the plaintiff Taylor kept his claim alive by filing a timely suit against
his insurer's solidary obligor; whereas the respondent allowed his claim
to die in California and subsequently seeks to revive his claim by
moving to Louisiana and invoking its lengthier prescriptive period." 8
Indeed, this was an essential difference, and the court was entirely correct
in so holding. Let us assume, however, that California had a three year
prescription for UM actions, as opposed to Louisiana's two, and that the plaintiff
in Rafferty did file an action in California within two and a half years from the
accident. In such a case, the question will be whether this action, which was
timely under California law but not under Louisiana law, could cause the
interruption of the Louisiana prescription. Under the broad Taylor statement that
the timeliness of the foreign action is determined by the standards of the foreign
court,21 9 the answer could be affirmative. However, as explained earlier,
Taylor should not be read in that fashion. Indeed, it would be anomalous to
speak of an interruption of an accrued prescription. Thus, the better view is that
the filing of the California action would not interrupt the accrued Louisiana
prescription. This case would then be identical to Smith and Kozan, and would
be a candidate, perhaps not a good one, for the exception of subparagraph I of
the second paragraph of Article 3549.
216. Rafferty, 613 So. 2d at 729.
217. 579 So. 2d 443 (La. 1991), discussed supra at note 208. Taylor differed from Rafferty in
several respects. The plaintiff in Taylor was a Louisiana resident, who was insured for UM coverage
under a policy issued to his Louisiana employer. He was injured in an Arkansas accident and sued
the tortfeasor in Arkansas not only within that state's three-year statute of limitation, but also within
Louisiana's two-year prescription.
218; Rafferty, 613 So. 2d at 729.
219. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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Returning to Rafferty, this case may be usefully contrasted with Louisiana
Land & Exploration Co. v. Enserch Corp.,220 a diversity case decided under
the new law. Enserch involved an action on a contract that was arguably
governed by Texas law.22' Texas limitation law would bar the action, but
Louisiana prescription law would not. After quoting in length from Reporter's
comment (i) of Article 3549, the court found that the exception contained in
subparagraph 2 of the second paragraph of the article was inapplicable
because maintenance of this action is warranted by Louisiana's policies
of providing a forum for its citizens and extending a more lengthy
prescriptive period of ten years for actions on contracts.
LL&E has its principal place of business in Louisiana, and
Louisiana's interest in maintaining the action outweighs the court
system's general interest in discouraging forum shopping under the
circumstances. Therefore, even assuming that Texas law controls the
merits of this dispute, the court finds insufficient legal reason to alter
the general rule of applying the forum's prescription law.222
The contrast with Rafferty is instructive. The two cases together illustrate that
the forum's "relationship to the parties or the dispute, 223 and especially its
relationship to the plaintiff, will prove instrumental in determining whether to
apply the exception of subparagraph 2. When the forum's relationship to the
plaintiff and the dispute is as tenuous and suspect as in Rafferty, the exception
is likely to be held applicable. The action will be dismissed, unless the plaintiff
proves the existence of "compelling considerations of remedial justice ' 224
warranting the maintenance of the action in this state. On the other hand, when
the forum's relationship to the plaintiff and the underlying contract or other
dispute is as solid as was in Enserch, the exception will be found inapplicable.
The action will be maintained, regardless of the existence of other considerations
of remedial justice, because in most cases such a relationship will implicate the
forum state's policy in providing a judicial forum for its own citizen or for
contracts or other transactions centered therein.
C. Some Interim Conclusions
The few cases decided since the enactment of the new Louisiana conflicts
law provide too small a sample from which to draw general conclusions.
220. Civ. A. No. 92-02057, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15710 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 1992). Caveat:
This author consulted with plaintiffs in this case.
221. This issue was not litigated; however, the court appeared skeptical as to whether Texas law
would actually be applicable to the merits of the action. See id. at *3 ("even assuming that Texas law
controls the merits of this dispute").
222. Id. at *2-3.
223. La. Civ. Code art. 3549, 2, subpar. 2.
224. Id.
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Nevertheless, a few tentative observations can be ventured. First, some litigants
seem to pay insufficient attention to the conflicts dimension of their case and
thus fail to raise timely or appropriately the choice-of-law issue. This phenome-
non was more common under the previous law, but it is still encountered under
the new law. Second, the cases decided so far under the new law have remained
entirely within its letter and spirit. Third, it seems that, so far, courts have been
able to apply the new law more easily than most of its critics had been willing
to concede during the drafting years. The new law has reduced uncertainty and
has restored consistency in Louisiana conflicts jurisprudence. It is hoped that the
same consistency will be maintained in the future.

